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The Role of American Diplomacy in the Louisiana Purchase.

APPROVED BY.MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Thomas D. Morris
When a powerful and ambitious nation peacefully transfers
almost 600,000,000 acres to a comparatively insignificant
nation, the event deserves careful scrutiny and evaluation.
The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 was such a transaction.
Although events and personalities surrounding the Purchase
were complex and numerous, the one factor to be examined
here is the role of American diplomacy.

The problem is to

determine the influence American diplomacy had in securing

2

the Louisiana Purchase.
American diplomacy of 1803 originated with President
Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of State· James Madison.
To understand their goals and frustrations, their letters and
writings have been examined.

The diplomats entrus,ted with

executing America's .foreign policy and negotiating with
Spain, England and Fr·ance were Charles PitJ,ckney, Rufus King,
Robert Livingston and James Monroe.

Letters and biographies

of these diplomats, with the exception of Charles:.. Pinckney,
have also been reviewed.

Charles Pinckney•s activities are

mentioned briefly since his diplomacy was only tangential to
the events in France and the United States.
Other sources were:

biographies of Jefferson, Monroe

and Livingston; histories of Spain,. France, the United States
and Louisiana; the American State Papers and additional
Government publications.
From these sources the role of American diplomacy in
the Louisiana Purchase appears creative, assertive and
persistent.

Jefferson and Madison were careful to

peace while promoting American·interests.

preserve~·

Together Robert

Livingston and James Monroe, America's ministers in France,
acquired Louisiana.

The r.easons for the Purchase lie, in

part, witL American diplomacy and, in part, with Napoleon.
Robert Livingston

persi~tently

reminded French officials

of the economic disadvantages of developing_ Louisiana and of

3
the unlikelihood that Americans would long tolerate the
closure of New Orleans.

In.Washington D.

c.

Jeffersop and

Madison used the French charge Pichon to communicate to
French

Minister·~alleyrand

appointment of James Monroe

this American belligerency.
demon~trated

The

the United States'

commi trr1ent to resolve those points of contention between
France and the

u.

S.

:Meanwhile Napoleon was watching his dreams of a French
empire in North America crumble as his disease-ridden army
failed to acquire control of Santo Domingo.

If his army

cou.ld not conquer Santo Dorriingo, the hope of a successful
French defense of New Orleans, in case of a.n American e.ttack,
dimmed.

America's offer to buy New Orleans and the Floridas

proved that she possessed money and was committed to resolve
the immediate problems of the right of deposit at New Orleans

and the right to navigate the Mississippi River.

American diplomats offered an alternative which the
First Consul initially ignored but eventually accepted as
his plans for a French empire in North America. wece destroyed.

Napoleon's failure in Louisiana and his renewed interest
in fighting England compelled him to accept an alternative

wr..ich ·provided him with money for armaments.

The F1irst

Consul averted his attention from Louisiana to Europe and
the Louisiana Purchase was negotiated.

To France the

transaction was a means to renew her expansionistic efforts
in Europe:

to the United States the Purchase was an unexpected

4
milestone which offered innwnerable agricultural and
economic opportunities and provided an additional impetus
to America's westward movement.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
On May 2, 1803 France ceded almost six hundred million ~
acres to the United States.

The cession formally ended

French attempts to establish a western empire and allowed

the United States to extend her borders
River.

French motives remained

dlv~rted

be~ond

~xpansionistic

the Mississippi

but Napoleon

his attention from Louisiana to Europe.

This

diversion, resulting from the French failure to regain
control of Santo Domingo, was opportune for the American
diplomat, Robert R. Livingston, who was attempting to purchase
New Orleans and the Floridas from Napoleon.
Hobert Livingston's efforts were only one factor of
several which encouraged France to relinquish Louisiana to
a relatively insignificant foreign nation.

Robert Livingston,

James Monroe, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison used influence
arrogance, persistence and unorthodox suggestions to preserve
American interests by winning concessions from France.

'When

the French interest in colonizing North Amer·ica declined,

America's willingness to buy land and her apparent ability
to provide money for such purchases encouraged the French.
Resumption of war with England required specie and since
Americans seemed a likely source, the French engaged the

2

Americans in serious negotiations regarding Louisiana.
Less than one month after the French offered to sell all of
Louisiana, the transaction known as the Louisiana.Purchase
was officially

complet~d.

The Purchase involved

terr~tory

by the Spaniards as early as

which had been discovered

1519. 1 .Spanish and French explor-

ers continued to explore the terrain for mercantilistic
reasons until the 1660 1 s when the estranged French coureurs
~

bois, Radisson and Groseilliers, suggested to England's

Charles I I that the fertile Mississippi Valley be colonizedii
This English interest in colonization was short-lived but
the Frerich, fearing these Anglo-expansionistic designs,
likewise encouraged the exploration and colonization of the
Mississippi

V.~lley.

In 1674 Louis Joliet and Father Jacques

Marquette traveled 2,750 miles on the Mississippi River and
confirmed that the Mississippi Valley was vast and incalculably rich for agriculture and minin.g.3

Eight years later

LaSalle explored the River to its mouth and on April 9, 1682
claimed ·Louisiana for France.

Although LaSalle encouraged

French officials to establish colonial settlements in Louisiana,
1 Marshall Sprague, So Vast, So Beautiful A Land:
Louisiana and the Purchase (Boston: Little, 1974), p.
~

3

~.,

p. 22.

~., p. 37.

5.

3
such colonization was not undertaken due to a change of
leadership in Quebec which discouraged both exploration and
colonization.4
Apparently the French government changed its mind in
1698 when

Pie~re

Le Moyna, sieur .. d 1 Iberville,
. was assigned
to explore the Mississippi Valley. He reco~enued that mis4

sions be established in the area and tobacco, indigo, rice
and wheat be:·raised.5

and founded towns.

Iberville and his crew built forts

In 1704 seventy-five soldiers, five priests

from Quebec, two nuns and twenty-three women arrived in
Louisiana from France in order to establish a colony. 6
From 1704 to 1762 colonization was unprofitable.
There was gradual progress in agrieultureaand mining but France
failed to receive

~ny

investment returns--a fact which did

not endear Louisiana to France.7

At the close of the French

and Indian War in the Treaty of Fontainebleau of November 3,
1762, the defeated French ceded Louisiana to Spain. 8

4Sprague,

5~.,

p. 57.

pp. 88-90:

6 James Q. Howard,.History of the Louisiana Purchase
(Chicago: Callaghan & Slo~pany, 19d2), p. 23.

u. 3.

?Binger Hermann, The Louisiana Purchase (Washington D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1e9e), p. 18.
8 Howard, p. 28.
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While the Spanish governed Louisiana, Americans ventured
westward and New Orleans became a most important commercial
center.

The Mississippi River was an essential highway to

western American farmers and the right of deposit at. New Orleans
was an inval·uable economic ·asse-t.

At tbe elose of the

•,

Revolutionary War English conct1·asiot>.s extended the boundaries
of the United States to the Mississippi River and assured her
the right to navigate the River.

Spain, believing that

th~

navigation of the Mississippi eas a privilege to be granted
only during critical times, aavocated that American navigation
should be diaallowed. 9
It took twelve years to reach an agreement between
Spain and the U.
I

New Orleans.

s.

regarding the Missi,sippi River and

In the Pinckney Treaty of

1795 Americans ac-

quired the right to navigate the Mississippi and the right
of deposit at New Orleans. 10

At:.the end of three years, this

agreement was to be reviewed and if the Spanish decided that
New Orleans should no longer be the deposit place, another
site, somewhere on the banks of the Mississippi, was to be
selected. 11 .
From 1795 to 1800 the United States continued to enjoy
the rights guaranteed in the Pimlmey Treaty.
9

Americans were

Howard, pp. 30-34·

10

Paul A. Varg, Foreign Policies of the Founding Fathers
Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press,
1963), p. 150.
\~ast

11

Hermann, p.

24.
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secure with these rights; economic growth continued and
shippers round the arrangement most advantageous as they
also avoided the payment of Q'.UStom d·uties • 12 While Americans
grew increasingly dependent on the Mississippi River and
New Orleans, Spain sig~ed with.hance ~he secret .Treaty of'
San Ildefonso in October 1800.

France acquired Louisiana while
Spain received the Italian pro~ince or Tuscany. 13
Americans' sense or security was dist:ux>bed by rumors
of the cession.

The report had bo be verified and the

American minister in England, Rufus King, was .the first to
acquire and dispatch official confirmation when he enclosed
a copy of the treaty in a letter dated November 20, 1801 to
Secretary of State James Madison.14
Americans.war~

apprehensive.

Spain had been a passive

neighbor and it was diffic·ult to predict what France would
do under the leadership of the miiitaristic Napoleon.

France

and England had concluded their Peace Preliminaries in October.
1801 and with war between these two courttries drawing to a
close, France might divert her attention to North America. 1 5
12
.
Merrill D. feterson, Thomas Jefferson & the New Nation
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970}, p. 746.

l3sprague, p. 279. ·
14Dumas Malone, Jefferson and His Time vol. 4, Jefferson
1
the President (Boaton:-··· '):,ittle, Brown & Company, 1962), p. 248 •
517

.l5J. Steven Watson, The Reign of George III (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1970), ·p. 4lo.

/
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French General Leclerc 1 s expedition to Santo Domingo in 1801
to quell Toussaint L'Ouverture•s rebellion of blacks and to
re-aatablish French control of" the island indicated that
Napoleon was interested in western affairs. .The presence of
30,000 French soldiers

eo

to the States enhanced the
anxieties of a number.of Ame~Lean eit&zens and leaders. 16
clos~.
';

I

To monitor French activities, the newly-elected
President, Thomas Jefferson, and the recently-appointed
Secretary of State, James Madison, formulated and condueted
an assertive, but oa·utious, foreign policy,
diplomats in

~ngland,

Wbile American

Spain and France endeavored to verify

rumors and protect American interests.

16
Marshall Smelser, The Democratic Republic:
1815 (New York; Harper&: Row, 1968), p. 89.

1801-

CHAPTER II
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE LOUISIANA CESSION
Thomas Jefferson's participation in politics dated
back to 1769 when he was a member or the Virginia House or
Burgesses.

From Virginia, Jefferson ventured to Philadelphia

as a delegate to the First and Second Continental Congresses.
In 1784 the Congress appointed Jefferson to join Benjamin
Franklin and John Adams in France to engage in negotiations
for commercial treaties in Europe. 1 Jefferson l~ft France
in 1789 with plans to retire·to Monticello but en route home
learned that President George Washington had appointed him
Secretary of State.

When John Adams was elected President in

1796, Jefferson was elected Vice-President and his dissatisfaction with Adam's policies compelled him to campaign actively
in the Presidential race of 1800.
Aaron Burr and Thomas Jefferson
to the House of Representatives.

A tie resulted between

a~d

the election

w~s

transferred

On February 17, 1801

Jefferson was elected President by a margin or one vote. 2
His victory was narrow but this failed to restrain his attempts
1 The Thomas· Jefferson PaRers, selected with commentary by
Frank Donovan (New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963), p. 88.
2 John c. Miller, The Federalist Era: 1789-1801,(New York:
Harper & Row, 1960), p. 273.

l
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to execute the policies he and his close friend and political
supporter, James Madison, proposed.

;

·James Madison was fifty-one years of age when Jefferson
appointed him Secretary of State.
was extensive.
an

His political background.

He was a eoauthor of

energe~ic membe~

of the

nation~,

Th~

Federalist Papers,

first· Congress and a

founder of the Jeffe~sonian Republican party in that Congress.3
In 1797 Madison retired from Congress but not from his polit-

ical concerns, soon becoming a dynamic force behind Virginia's
opposition to the repressive Alien and Sedition Acts.

In

1801 he forsook retirement,· accepted the position of Secretary
1

of State and commenced working .on a foreign policy which
combined prudence with moder~tion.4

I

·:filcgether Jefferson and Madison formulated a foreign
policy based on economy, isolationism, and westward expansionism.

one

of the first

bu~getary

decisions was to reduce

the number of· countries with which the United States officiaily
conducted diplomatic relations.5

Embassies in Lisbon, Berlin

and The Hague were closed, while ministries were maintained
in Spain, Franee and England.
William

Sho~t,

To his former Secretary,

Jefferson. wrote on October 3, 1801, "We call

3smelser, p. 186.

~alone, p. 52.

5~.,

p. 102.

I
'

9

in our diplomatic missions, barely keeping up those to the
6
most important nations."
These policies reflected a move toward economy and
I

isolationism.

Isolationism protected American interests

while EuDope engulfedne.salf in policies which required t"orce
ana

needl~ssly

absorbed the energies of nations.

First Inaugural Address delivered March

In Jefferson's

4, 1801, he referred

to the United States as the "strongest government on earth,"
who was "engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and
forget right."

America was far from Europe and thus "kindly

separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating
havoc of one quarter of the globe; too high-minded to endure
the degradations of the others; possessing a chosen country,
with room enough for our descendants to the thousandth and
thousandth generation."7
The

u. s.

Government was capable of developing economical-

ly and maintaining .. her republican principles if not encumbered
by European alliances and demands.

With these nations the

writill~s of Thomas Jefferson, eds. Andrew A. Lipscomb
and Albert Elery Bergh {Washington D. c.: The Thomas
Jefferson Memorial Association, 1903), vol. 10, p. 267.
(Hereafter referred to as Jefferson.)
7 rnaugura.1 Addresses of the Presidents of the United
States f-rom George Washington to John F. Kennedy, (Washington D.C.:
U. S. Government Prin~ing Office, 1961), pp. 14-15.
(Hereafter referred to as Inaugural Addresses.)
6

I

10

States endeavored to enjoy "peace, commerce, and honest
friendship," but "entangling alliances with none." 8

Ethics

were to control foreign affairs, tor Jefferson.in his
Second Inaugural Address as$erted:

We are firmly convince4, and.we act on that
conviction, that with nation,, as with i~dividuals,
our interests, ·soundly ealouiated, w~ll -~v.,r be
found· inseparable from ouri:•oral duties. f..J
Jeffersonts moral view toward foreign affairs did not
preclude his

d~earns

of westward expansion.

As early as

1786 he wrote:
We sho·uld take care not i,.tJo <..tllink it for the
interest of that great continent (South America
and its appendages) to press too soon on the
Spaniards.
Those countries cannot be in better
hands. My fear is that they are too feeble to
hold them till our population can be sufficiently
advanced to gain it from them piece by piece.
The navigation of the Mississippi we must have.
This is all we are as yet ready to receive.10 .

His·.:view of the Spaniards .as stewards of future
American territory allowed him to approve of the Pinckney
Treaty of 1795. 11 For the present the status quo of Louisiana
was adequate since the free navigation of the Mississippi and
the right to deposit at New Orleans were terms of the treaty.
America•.~

future was bright and her possible accomplish-

ments were unlimited.

When ready,. she would assume control

·8 Inaugural Addresses, p.

15.

9Francis w. Hirst, Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson
(New York: Macmillan Company, 1926), pp. 405-406.
10
Peterson, pp. 745•746.
11

Sprague, p. 273.

/
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of western lands not presently under her jurisdiction.
While Europe quarreled and squandered her energies on useless,
feeble and politically immoral activities, the United States
would firmly, but cautiously, assert herself.

An examination

of Jefferson's foreign policy led Paul A. Varg in the Foreign
Policies of the Founding Fathers tp accuse Jefferson of constructing a "policy of unilateralism that paid scant attention
to the legitimate interests of oth~r nations." 12 What Varg
perceived as legitimate interests, Jefferson regarded as
degrading alliances designed by European countries to further
their power and wealth.

These plans for

self-aggrandi~ement

were seconctary in importance to the tsconoiaic goals ana republican

princip~es

of the United States.

ism was unilateral and paternalistic.

Jefferson's national•
European affairs should

be ignored as long as they affected Europe alone; when
European possessions adjacent to the States instituted or
followed policies contrary to the interests of those States,
American indifference ceased.
The rumor in the early months of 1801 that Louisiana
and the Floridas had been ceded to France caused concern
among the Trans-Appalachian farmers and American leaders
including the President and the Secretary of State.

On

June 1, 1801, James<Madison dispatched a letter to his
personal friend, Governor James Monroe of Virginia.
12 varg, p. 148.

Madison

L2

r·e;lajed the rumor, decr>ied its

po~sibility

and a.sked

-r-·:oucoE: Lo cYamine the subject in its every aspect in order·

to think of any ideas which could be of service to the nation.
Eight day::; after this note was written, Madison sent to the

American minister in Spain, Charles Pinckney, an official
communication repeating the rwno1'J and instructing him to
1

seek ve~ification. 3

On April

18,

1802 1 following the confir-

rnation of Lhe cession by Rufus King in London, Thomas
/

Jerfercon wrote a personal letter to Robert R. Livingston,
the U.

s.

r:1inister in France, instructing

him to also

verifj~

According to the President, the cession rever·sed

the r-Ll!nor.

Lhe political relations of the U. S. with France.

Up to this

point France had been regarded as a "natural friend" with whom
there were no differences but when that nation acquired posses-

,,

si.on of New Orleans, she became an enemy of the United StateG.-4
Jefferson explained:

There is on the globe one single spot, the
possessor of which is our natural and habitual
enemy.
It is New Orleans, through which the
prod~ce of three-eighths of our territory must
pass to market, and from its fertility it will
ere long yield more than half of our whole produce
and contain more than half of our inhabitants.
France, placing herself in t~at door, assumes to

us the attitude of defiance. ~
lJHalone, p. 250.

14 ~-,
ri., .
.:i

p.

,

., ,

j.l..L.

r-'

1 -,

..,.'":cf.i'ersor., p. 312.

13
Having France as a neighbor presented immediate problems
whereas Spain had been tolerated.

Jefferson continued:

Spain might have retained it quietly for years.
Her pacific dispositions, her feeble state, would
induce her to increase our facilities there so that
her possession of the plaee would be hardly felt by
us, and it would not, perhaps, be very long before
some circumstance might arise, which might make the
cession of it to us the price of something of more
worth· to her. Not so can it ever be in the hands
of France: the impetuosity of her temper, the
energy anu restlessness of her character, placed in
a point of eternal friction with us, and our
character, which, though quiet and loving peace and
the pursuit of wealth, is high-minded, despising
wealth in competition with insult or injury,
enterprising and energetic as any nation on earth;
these circumstances render it impossible that France
and the United States can continue long friends, when
theYi meet in so irritable a position.16
Jefferson suggested to Livingston that one possible
solution to the immediate problem was an alliance with
England:
The day that France takes possession of New Orleans,
fixes the sentence which is to restrain her forever
within her low-water mark. It seals the union of
two nations, who, in conjunction, can maintain exclusive possession of the ocean. From that moment, we
must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation.
We must turn all our attention to a maritime force,
for which our resources place us on very high ground;
and haviilg formed and connected together a power which
may render reinforcement of her settlements here impossible to France, make the first cannon which shall be
fired in Europe the signal for the te a:ring :tip &· :Set-_..
tlement she may have made, and for holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the United British and American nations.17
J6sefferson, p. 312.

l7~., p. 312-313.

I
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If France assumed possession of New Orleans, then an
alliance with England became necessary.

With the threat of

an Anglo-American alliance the benefits France

obtained~·;by

taking control of New Orleans were negligible.

If France

justified possession by maintaining that Louisiana was necessary as a wartime depot for the .West
argued that since

t~e

I~dies,

Jeffer_son

island of New Orleans was not needed

for supplies in times of peace, it could not be depended
upon in war; its location made it susceptible to easy
. t ercep t•ion. 18
in

Jefferson was careful to propose a possible resolution.
of this conflict of interests.

The cession to the United

States of the island of New Orleans and the Floridas would
remove "the causes of jarring and irritation between us," and
"would, at. any rate, relieve us from the necessity of taking
immediate measures for countervailing such an operation by
arrangements in another quarter."

However, this arrangement

would not eliminate the possibility of an American quarrel
with France since she would remain a neighbor and her strength
and desire for power would sustain tensions. 1 9
After depicting the tension the cession had created,
suggesting an alliance with England and questioning the value
18

Jefferson, p. 314.

l9~., p. 315.

l

15
of Louisiana to France, Jefferson urged Livingston to confront
French officials with these

considera~ions.

Time was with

the American minister since troops dispatched to the island
of Santo Domingo would most
after they conquered the

lik~ly

islan~.

proceed to Louisiana only
Jefferson explained:

If this were the arrangment, it will give you time
to return again-· and again ~o the charge. For the
conquest of· St. Domingo will not be a short work.
It will take considerable time, and wear down a
great number of soldiers.20
The previous reference to an alliance with England was
repeated by Jefferson and Madison in their conversations with
British representative Thornton a~d French charg{ Pichon.
Pichon was led to believe that Jefferson was quite willing
to prepare for a possible Anglo-American rapprochement. 21
This inclination, coupled with repeated expressions of the
inadvisability of the cession, 22 convinced Pichon of America's
intent to pppose the cession and he sent reports to France
revealing American opposition to French actions.
Historian Dumas Malone believes that these conversations
possibly were more influential than the petitions of American
ministers in Europe. 2 3 Since influence is difficult to
20 Jefferson, p.

21

Malone, pp.

315.

292~293.

22

George Dangerfield, Chancellor Robert R. Livingston
of New York (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1960}, p. 352;
Malone, pp. 292-293.

23 Malone, p. 291.

I

'

16
measure, one can certainly propose that reports from Pichon
and Thorton made the statements
credible.

or

American ministers more

Although in both instances the information originated

with Jefferson and Madison, the European

mini~ter.s

in the

u. s.

were able to observe the react.ion of the American cit*zenrt
'

and thereby verify the President,. s and Secr~tary of State's
contentions.
While the Peaee of Amiens offered England and France
a lull in fighting, the United States confronted 'the gravest
of diplomaticj~ems. 24

To resolve this problem J•fferson

and Madison continued to engage Thorton and Pichon in private
conversations while American diplomats abroad

~tilized

their

abilities and opportunities to verify thec,cession, determine
its extent and effect an agreement insuring American :i.nterests.
The outcome could not be an entangling alliance since that
would interfere with
/

America'~

but an arrangement that

remove~

political and moral development
the threat of French occupation

of New Orleans without committing the United States to µnreasonable and stifling French demands.

These qualifications

served as guidelines for Axaerican di.plomats in Spa'in, England
and France.

Since the diplomatic corps had been reduced, the

r~sponsibility

of obtaining information and negotiating a

settlement with France fell only to Charles Pinckney in
Madrid, Rufus King in London and Robert R. Livingston in Paris.
2

~alone, p. 239.

CHAPTER III
THE AMEHICAN DIPLOMATS
Charles Pinckney•s personal

hi~tory
,1,

to the politics of South Carolina.and the
United States Constitution.

was closely

lir~ed

·'

~ormation

of the

In the late 1780 1 s the South

Carolina legislature appointed Pinckney one of four delegates
to the Constitutional Convention at which he
proposed Cunstitution. 1

~upported

the

After the Convention, Pinckney served

as Governor of South Carolina and in 1798 was elected to the

nation's Senate. 2

During the Presidential election of 1800

it appeared that Thomas Jefferson.mignt not receive South

Carolina's support but her votes ware forthcoming.
events leading to the
remain uncertain,
voting results.

Jef~e~son

Char~es

Although

victory in South Carolina

Pinckney assumed the credit for the

In his letters

~o

Jefferson, Pinckney

endeavored to impress upon the President that

h~s

national

victory, not just South Carolina•s,··was the direct result of
1Marvin R. Zahniser, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney:
Founding Father (Chapel.Hill, Nofth"Carolina: University
of North Carolina Press,.1967), 9• ·87-92.

2

1.E.i£., P• 206.

18
Pinckney' s efforts in Golurnbia, South Carolina o 3

\'lri ting

to Jefferson on December 2, 1800, befor·e it was known that
the elec"':,ion had resulted in a tie between Aax.. on Burr and
,Jefferson, Pinckney r·ecounted:
\·{e have had a hard 3.::~d f .rduous s trn._sg1e and I
found t~at as t~ere were no hopes fro~ ?hiladelphia
and it depended upon our State entirely to secure
Your Election ana that it would be almost death
to our hopes for r.Je to quit Colun1bia, I have remained
ur1til it is over and no'd permit !r;e to congratulate
You my dear sir.4
1

D~e

to the tie the election was transferred to the

Hou.se of Re pre sent.a ti ile s..

in

~;rrien

the new President

Febr~ary,

the House elected Jef:'"'erson
re~arded

Charles Pinckney

for his claiPJed efforts by appointing hiP1 tr..e hT.erican
~inistcr

to Spain.

SI'..ortly after- his ar·ri val in Spain, Pinc}:ney received
a letter from Ja.rnes Hadison dated June 9, 1801 whic~ relayed
the rmnors of the cession.,,

Since the extent of the cession

or the considerations upon which it was made were
.

\

Pinci-::ney was assured that the subject deserved his

inquiries. n

Spanish r:10tives were not

that ·the French betrayed their

o!:,\~ious

disi~terest

in North America by acquiring Lo .lisian2.
1

•.illi~nown,
"vigil2~nt

but it appeared

in procuring land
TI'...e shift nay have

'been due to French jealousy of the United States'· partia1i ty
to~ard

Great 3ritain; French alarm that

3zahniser, p. 227.
4), . d

~-·'

, 27

p .. 2

•

~n~land

intended to
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capture the mouth of the Mississippi River; or French concern
that the United States might form an alliance with England.
Although the chief difficulty did not lie with Spain, Madison
instructed Pinckney to learn whether the cession had actually
taken place.5
Despite Pinckney' s efforts, the

~panish

to confirm or deny the ru.111or of the cession.

Secretary-.ref'used
A J.etter rrom

Madison dated May 11, 1802 reveals that Pinckney had either
failed to share his findings with the Secretary of State or
had nothing to write.

Madison appealed to the American

minister:
We are still without a line from you since
your arrival at Madrid, and feel an increasing
solicitude to hear from you on the subject of
Louisiana. 6
Although the cession had been confirmed by Rufus King's
~ovember

dispatch of a copy of the treaty to Jefferson and

Madison, the knowledge of Spanish intentions remained
valuable since a reversal of the transaction was possible •
../

If Louisiana passed into ¥rench hands,

~incKney

was instructed

to make some arrangement whereby the Floridas and New Orleans
were ceded to the United States.

These instructions extended

5American State Pa ers Forei n Relations {Washington D.C.:
Gales and Seaton, 1 32 , Vol. 2, p. 10.
Hereafter referred
to as ASPFR•)

6Ibid.,

p.

517.
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Pinckney's responsibilities and Madison carefully pointed

o~t

that this was evidence of the increased importance of the

mission .. 7
In regard to the Floridas both

~adison

and Pinckney

assuined that they were not included in the cession..
o~feri~g

to guarantee the

re~aini~g

By

Spanish colonies west of

the Mississippi, Pinckney hoped to obtain the Floridas from
Spain.
~ad

Ee also pointed out to Spanish leaders that the Floridas

never been a productive colony and with Louisiana under

?rench control,

t~ey

would even be less valuable.

Eowever,

the Mobile River and others east of the Mississippi River
·1-·:ere important waterways for Americans residing on their upper
courses and, therefore, the Flcridas would be valuable to the
. 1
""
• _,_
-+ '
•
uni. t e d S ta~es
cesp1Ge
cneir

-1

~adison

1

s

•

•

.1-

proxini~y

~o

F re~cn
, possess1ons.
·
S

changed opinion regarding the

?loridas is reflected in his
Charles ?inckney.

let~er o~

statu~

July 26, 1802 to

If so, it -....Tas unnecessary for

?inckney to ascertain the price Spain

~ould

accept for those

T'nerefore, for the present the cession would

remain the object of negotiation in France.

7~SP~R
1
2 , p. .::::ir17 ..
.:::__:: r .... , ~•10_.
8

Pinckneyts efforts

1s aac J. Cox, The \·[est ?lorida Controversy:
.r·oh;-r:: HopY.:insFr·e2·s, 19T8T, p. b-.T.

(Balti~ore:

of the

He now thought the Floridas and New Orleans

1.r;ere included in the cession.

possessions.

.J..

1789-181}
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were not to be terminated as they could be used to cultivate

good relations with Spain
to

sp~ak

whic~J.

to French officials on

might encourage Spanish leaders
bc~alf

of .Arr.er-ican interests.

Also it was possible that in the future Spain might be
extricated from her agreement with France and again be free
to dispose of' the territories presently constituting the

cession. 9

Xadison in a letter dated January 18, 1803

reiterated that negotiations could likely be accomplished
in Paris and Pinckney was to be informed of these negotiating

efforts in order to cooperate if the occasion demanded
.

coac t iono

10

It was not ·:.J.ntil 1804, when the qL1estion con-

cerning the inclusion of West Florida in the Louisiana Purchase
arose and Spain denied its transfer, that Pinckney played a
major negotiating role.

~onroe

was to join Pinckney in Spain

and together they were to negotiate for the Floridas9

However,

Pinckney exceeded his instructions by not waiting for Monroe
before pressing matters in Madrid.

He raised troublesome

questions about the Floridas, criticized the Spanish for
t~eir

failure to ratify a Claims Convention negotiated in

1802 between Spain and the U. S., and issued

bl~~dering

statements about the l·i:obile Act, a statutory claim to the

9~~PFR, vol. 2, p. 519.
lOib~d.,

p • .529.
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navigation of the rivers in West Florida.

These actions

made the 2.r:.ibassador diplo~natically ineffective • 11

\frnen

Monroe did join Pinckney, their joint efforts failed to
secure West Floridao
AJ.though Pinr.;hiics ~ s assigwnent was not to a place
whe:Pe the most important nee;otlating efforts 1·rnre underway,

he was nevertheless responsible for the securenent and speedy
dispatch of inrorMation regarding the cession to Madison.
Some communication was to be expected, especially at such
a critical time, but it was not forthcoming.
his instructions by proceeding

befor~

Later he violated

Monroe's arrival.

His

negligence and impetuosity hindered diplomatic success.

I

Fortu~ately

Jefferson and Kadison in the years 1801 to

ieo3

did not need to depend on Charles Yinckney as their only

source of informatj_ono
-.·mo

dispatc~ed rni.lCh

It i-;as Rufus King, not Pinckney,

of the r·equested inforwetion and confirma-

tion of events.

Rufus King's political experience waa extensive and his
politic al affi lia ti on cont:eoversial.
~sked

became President and
~~ +

~~ave,

.
~uec i·ine d 12
King
o

1:lhen Gecrge \''8.shington

King to serve as Secretary of

In the late 1790's he had been a

llvarg, P· 159.
12

Bradf ci"'d Perkins, The First Happrocherrient: Englar. . d
c.nd the United States (PhilaCielphia: University- of'
Pennsylvan:ra:-Press 0955), p. 37.
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me:r.iber of the irmer circ1e of High Fed"eralis ts who had
encour~ged

war with France and supported an alliance with

Engl8.r..dc l3

It was while serving as a Fede:r·alist Senator

from New York that King

applie~

for the position of Minister

Plenipotentiary to Great Britain.

His application for appoint-

ment wgs sent tbrough Alexander Hamilton to Secretary of State
Timothy Pickerir:.g
It

-~..,i th

Ha..'llil ton's recom.'11enda ti on attached.

r~ead:

-;·Je

If we had power to make a man for this purpose,
.
.
cou J_d no t irr:agine
a f l. 1_,er t'.::.an 'M
__ r. K.
_ ing. i~·1......
.j.... -'-

1.J

On Hay 19, 1796 King was officially nominated to the
post.

Followi~g

Congressional consent, King traveled to

EngJ.and and assur:-::ed his dip1o::natic responsibilitieso

tn Ensland, prior to the Presidential
intimated in· his letters ·that he was

ele~tion
thin~dng

home if the ?i.epublica:ns were vie torious.

":Tnile

of 1800, King
of rieturning

\:H1en Jefferson was

elected, King believed that the policies of the new President
~o~ld

not allow him to bring his negotiations

resa~ding

Revolutionary war debts to a satisfactory conclusion.

the
King

recognized that the negotiations could not be completed
befo~e

Jefferson's Inauguration but since he devoted so much
1 3Peterson, p. 600.

lh· Per_{ins,
l .
P..

46 ..
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time to these talks, he determined to continue his efforts

~ . 1 J e11erson
.... ,. .
·
d 'ni~e
.
l5
re i ieve

un~i

n1e status of Ki::1g' s assignr:1ent re1:iained unclear e\ren
as late as ~ay 27, 1801, when friend and fellow-New Yorker,
Robert Troup, wrote Rufus King the following appraisal:
Ye all believe that it is not ~r. Jefferson's
present plan to supersede.~ou. Mr. Korris seems
confident he will not do it.
And yet the course
thus far pursued by ~r. Jefferson wit~ regard
to removals has strong marks of an entire devotion
to party. 16

Hi thin the Republican ranks there i-rns extreme pressure
to re:rJ.ove King, with one of the earliest and most adamant

a.C.vocatGs being JG.IGes Eonroe of Virginia.

Fearful of the

appointment of Federalists to public offices and receptive
to the objections of fellow Virginians, Eonroe raised the
~~estiol!

of the propriety of retaining Rufus King in a letter

dated April 29, 1801 to Jefferson:
Tl-.:.ere is another object to ·which I found the
attention of the nepublicans here, comprising
:r}any fro~n the country who are attending our cou:rt
of appeals & the federal Cto, drawn with much
more ~nxiety, that is the propriety of continuing

Xr. K. (King) at the 3ritish Ct.17
lSThe_ Lif.§._~d Co:r:r:.~.:po~den_~ of .B_ufus !i_i~f-6 ed a Charles R.
~ing (!fow Yor~{:
Putnaffi, 1096), vol. 3, p~o2-4vJ.
(Eereafter
referred to as K~~, vol. 3.)

16,Ibid.'
17r11
.!.n.e

DD.
..a...J,...

·r
•t•
~"lrJ

Ji ~S-11 C:9 •

.....,-/

,,,,,,

T

d

.. ings 01 v a:'1e s non.roe
e •
_,,-----·----__.,,,.-,-):'.'.
__
~ar1ilton \lfow York:
t:....."'1.lC1rnrcoc~:er Press,

p. 279.

.

n

1"

'II

St2.nislaus M•
1900), vol.

4,
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On the next day, Monroe wrote another letter ·to
Jefferson which, after reconsid·:;ration, he decided not to

send.

In this draft dispatch,

~onroe

clearly itemized his

objections to King's retention as Kinister Plenipotentiary
to Great Britain:
That as every cal2.I'.lity foreign & do~estic which
we have experienced has proceeced from Great Britain,
a person known to be friendly to ~er interests, ·
acquainted with our interior, able to guide her councils & plan her measures against us, ought not to
be left there under the present administration;@••
His continuance there will be considered by
that goverrJ11ent as a pY-oof that the pre sent
administration does not think itself solidly
founded at home, that it dreads the English
power & i~ resolved to keep terms with. it at all

hazards.,l

Four days later Monroe withdrew his objections,
declaring that when it ca-me time to act on Kingr s recall,

it

~as

a.far more delicate matter than.he had previously

imagined.19

In the 1790's Monroe had been the object of

Federalist browbeating and to avoid following their ''Unworthy
exa.mpJ.e 0 8.nd indulging his "private resentment at their

expense,

ti

ne reverse d b.
_is posi. t.:i..on .. 20
'

Despite Monroe's initial suggestion, Jefferson showed
no disposition to remove Rufus King, but rather left the time
181"

:.
~~,

p. 281 •

19Ibid., P• 279.
20ibid,,, P• 2800

26
21
.
' s resigna
.
t ion
.
. . t er h.imse .......
1 f
o f -,.
n.1ng
up \jo t,ne minis
.L

Instructed to continue negotiations for a convention regarding
pri -:rnte American debts to British creditors, Ki:ng followed
these orders while acquiring informatj_on about Europe and
Louisiana.
King diligently recorded for Madison the state of

J

European affairs as it affected the Peace of

~~iens,

the con-

firmation and extent of the rumored Louisiana cession, the
question of French occupation and settlement of Louisiana,

and the possibility of England working for the benefit of the
United States at the peace talks with France.
On April

25,

1801, King described for Madison the events

in Nortr:.ern Europe incJ.uding British activities in CopeP21agen
and Egypt, the

cheracte~

and view of the

ne~ ~nperor

of Russia and the conduct of the King of Sweden.

Alexander

In early

June he commented on the French army's diminishing chances
to maintain control of Egypt and alluded to French preparations
•
co invaue
..'.5rl

..1.

_::i

'1

•

•
h
vJ.s.

l an d~s. 2 2

T
.
1 •
d t,ne
· o 1".i.aaison, K.:._J.ng
exp-aine
'ir

.., •

•
+- •
importance of this in1orma1.-1on:

I mention these detached facts to prove that
the negotiation, which still goes on by courier
between Paris and London, must wait for and depend
rne.Life and Corr~ondence of__:~u~u~ KingJ ed. Charles R.
King (New York: i>utnam, t896), vol-:-1;., p. 201.
(Eeraafter
referred to as Ki~, vol. 4.)
21

22

Ibi~., vol. 3,

pp.

4.36-473.
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upon events still undecided in the North,
as well as in the South, and that all conjectures concernin~ its result must there-

fore be illusory.2~

The confirmation of the Louisiana cession and its
extent deserved and received King's imJnedia te attention.
By November 20th King had learned th at the Fifth Article of'

the 'rreaty of San Lorenzo

conf'irm~d

the cession o:f Louisiana

2J1
to France. '""T

The extent of the cession was unkncwn; it remained
impossible to determine if it included

Floridas.

~ew

Orleans and the

On November 25th Mr. King co~erred ~ith British

Secretary Lord Hawkesbury and received a copy of the treaty. 2 5
Neither the language of the treaty nor the interpretations

of Lord Hawkesbury made clear the extent of the cession.
King re:PJ.arked:
_Spain had

cert~inly

ceded Louisiana.

But he

/Lord Eawkesbur2/ did not exactly comprehend
the Territor~ included under that Term
/Louisiana?. 6

I

King expressed the opinion to Lord Hawkesbury that the

term trLouisiana" ref'erred only to lands west of the r-:ississippi,
not New Orleans and the Floridas.

2
2

3KiIIB,

4Ibi~.,

3, pp. 437-438.

vol.

vol.

4,

p.

25Ibid., P· 15..:19.
26Ibid., p.

18.

15.

The Treaty of Paris of 1762

28
I

placed the land east of the Mississippi River under England's
control and therefore only the land west of the River was
truly HLouisiana". 2 7

If, however, the Floridas and New Orleans

had been given to France, the rights and privileges of
~~ericans

relying on the rivers in the Floridas and the

right of deposit at New Orleans were definitely in jeopardy.

28

Another aspect of the cession which occupied King's
efforts involved French plans to occupy and colonize Louisiana.
On Novenber 20, 1801 King expressed the view that the French
Do~ingo

forces who were preparing to proceed to Santo

were

not to be employed later in the occupation of Louisiana. 2 9
Confirmation that no part of the expedition was traveling
toward Louisiana ca'l!e to the Arnerican r:iinister through
Lord Hawkesbury on November

25,

1801.3°

Eowever, on February

1802, King wrote to Hadison that it had been

11

de.finitely

settled" and a colony under the direction and cornmand o.f
General Bernadotte was to be sent to Louisiana and Florida.
The departure depended upon the affairs in Santo Domingo.
'ErJ.e

cha~acter

of the colony must have disturbed Jefferson

and :r-:adison, for King explained tr.e.t Louisiana, Guiana, and

2 7King, vol.
28

rbi~.,

4,

vol.

3,

p. 18.
p.

469.

29Ibid.' vol.

h, p. 15.

30Ibid., p. lq,,

.

5,

f
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the desert island of Tristan de Cunha had been spoken of
as places to send uthe rebellious and untractable negroes
and people of colorrt from St. Domingo and

otbe1~

French

colonies!3l
In addition to consulting Lord Hawkesbury about tne
extent and ramifications of the cession, Rufus King inquired
whether it altered the right of Americans to navigate the
Mississippi River, thereby negating the guarantees England
had made to the U. S. at the end of the Revolutionary War.

King's confidential letter to the British Secretary reviewed
the Treaty of Paris of 1783 ·which assured the right of British
subjects and American citizens to.navigate the river from its
source to the Gulf.

King sought to learn if the British

sovernment had received any

com.~unications

from S?ain or

France regarding the cession and if, in responding to these
communications, England had impaired the navigation rights
bequeathed to Americans.3
repJ.y came in May 1802.
no such communication

~ad

2

Lord Hawkesbury's confidential

Tne British official testified that

been received and His Majesty had

not "in any manner, directly or indirectly acquiesced in or
sanctioned this cession.u

As to the navigation rights,

Lord Hawkesbury assured King that with the cession, France
probably obtained possession of the Treaty of 1783 and if she
3lASPFR, p.
32King, vol.
~

513.

4, P·

109.

R
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chose not to violate this agreement, these rights of British
subjects and American citizens would be respected.33
Although England considered the cession "a measure of
the greatest consequence," they would not speak out against
the cession or promote American rights to navigate the
Mississippi River.34

Being willing to clarify aspects of

the cession was the extent of British aid and thus direct
diplomacy with French leaders was Jnnerica' s only hope.
\.fnen the Convention with England was signed in January
1802, Rufus King dispRtched his official letter of resignation
on Augi1st ~. J802 to the Secretary of State and gave April,
1803 as the termination date.35

In the late sQm..mer and

early auttL~n of 1802, King and his family traveled on the
Continent for a few weeks.wit~

Traveling to Paris, King consulted

the American minister, Robert Livingston, but no account

of their conference was recordea.3
~idiplomatic

6

King's career as a

agent of the United States was ending.

endeavored to confirm the cession's

existence~

extent and anticipate its consequences.

He had

determine its

However, the respon-

sibility of defending American rights and negotiating for the
33King, vol.
_____..:...;

4,

p. 123.

34ASPFR, p. 516.

35~alone,

p. 97; King, vol.

3 6King, vol.

4,

p. 179.

4,

p. 200.
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~nd

Floridas

New Orleans with the recipients of the cession,

the ..b'rench, fell to the newly-appointed A.merican minister

in France, Robert R. Livingston.

Robert R. Livingston had been a judge of an admiralty
court, a justice of the New York Supreme Court, a member of
the

Sta~p

Act Congress and a delegate to the Continental

Congress serving on the com.mittee of five assigned to draft
the Declaration of Independence.37
of

Appointed First Chancellor

York, he ad.ministered the oath of office to George

!~ew

Washington on his First Inauguration.
of New

Yoi.~'.<.
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D .11·i·11s
1

f

;~1~1

He served as Chancellor
n. brief interlude

~ ''2'.: J:.-'i.~· ...~·:::_~;~cd as

}.-.-:·.11

Secretary

Adams 1 s ad111inistration,

I,ivingston was averse-.to .the Alien and Sedition Acts. and
labored to get the Virginia Resolutions adbpted by the

New York legislature.3 9

When Thomas Jefferson believed in

December 1800 that he had been elected President, he began
to select a Cabinet and asked Livingston if he would serve

as the Secretary of the Navy.

JefI'erson wrote:

It is essential to assemble at the outset
persons to compose our administration, whose
talents, integrity and revolutionary nane and
principles may inspire the nation at or.ce,
37Hermann, p. 30.
~s
J

Sprague, p. 277.

39Dangerfield, p. 301.
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;·li th unbounded confidence. 4°

Livingston declined.

When the Presidential election

was resolved by the House of Representatives in February 1801,
Thomas Jefferson renewed his requests and among them, the
query to Livingston to serve as Minister Plenipotentiary to
France.

Realizing the sacrifices the Chancellor would make

l

l
i

\

.i

in accepting the position, Jefferson declared:

I

Tnough I am sensible of the advantages derived
from your talent to your particular State, yet I
cannot suppress the desire of adding them to the
mass to be e~ploard on the broader scale of the
nation at large.

I
i

t

Livingston accepted and forthwith received a congratulatory
note from the Governor of Virginia who would later cast a
pall over Livingston's ministry in France.

Monroe exclaimed:

Permit me to avail myself of the opportunity
furnished--by this young gentleman .. to assure· you
of the high satisfaction I have in Your appointto France, & to add my sincere wishes that
your mission may prove as grateful & honorable to
yourself as the auspices under which it is undertaken give you reason to expect it may be.42

me~t

Jefferson considered Livingston's political asset to
be his overall pro-French attitude despite his

the French Terror.43

revul~jon

to

His personal strengths included his

ability to read French well, his diligence and self-confidence.
40 Danger f.ie~
1 d , p. 301
-·

41 Jefferson,
42.Lonroe,
;p.

p. 210.
202
, •

43Dangerfield, p. 304.
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A major weakness was his inability to speak French fluently
due to his deafness.44

Of this condition William Short,

private secretary to Jefferson when he was ambassador to

France, "'-Trote that Livingston was "unfortw1ately, so deaf
that he will have to transact all his business by writing."
Despite this handicap, Short maintained that the recently
appointed minister was nan amiable and honorable rnan.u45
To Robert R. Livingston fell the responsibility of
negotiating with the French for the Floridas and New Orleans.
To be the Minister Plenipotentiary ,to France was in 1802 the
most demanding position in .American diplomatic circles.
Napoleon was fighting for his western empire and had already
secured Louisiana,

For the United States to oppose the

cession and French expansionism mi1itarily was unthinkable
and so America had to protect her rights diplomatically.
To think that the U. S. could compel France to alter her
foreign policy and to make concessions was sheer folly but
those
tent

~ere

Livingston's instructions.

arglli~ent

By engaging in persis-

and presenting creative alternatives, Livingston

hoped to change Napoleon's mind and remove France as a menace
to the burgeoning United States.

4~alone,

p. 250.

4SJefferson, p. 288.

C3APT:S:1 IV
PRO:SLEl·:S IN PARIS

Before sailing for France Livingston received explicit

instructions from tr.:.e President and Secretary of
·i~s~ructions
cessio~

·leaders
a~d

j

t~at

it was essential to confirm

rY:ie

t~e

and if it had not occurred, to stress to French
~.::,!1at

the }.";:'o;:,osed cession violated American ir:-:er0s-:s

tJ::::'."'ea:.eneC. ?:"a:oco-.:.....""ler:..can rela:.ions.

been ceded,
t~~e

stated

S..t~ate.

?~ench

Liv:..n~ston ~as

~o

refra~n

and to learn if they

the ?lo:::,icas :.o

u. s .......""
!

t~rn

I::' Louisiana had

from irritating

willing to

~are

Xot~ing ~as

to be

t~a~sfe~

do~e

w~ich

'...:ould

"~r1nect::2sarily

iI·ritate o:..i.r .fu°tu!'e neighbors, or

chec~

:.~e

whic~

literali~y

they

~ay

be disposed to exerc:..se

in relD.tion to t:-ie tr·ade and navigation tt.r·ough
of E1e :·:is sis s ippi.

11

J-,

t..I18

' .,

I:10Ut:.n

The contir::J.ance of existing Spanish

policies regarding the

1~ississippi

River was corur.ercially

vital and had to be maintai:.ied throu£;h diplo~s.tic efforts. 2
Girded with these

instructio~s,

Livinbston

i7~ediately

endeavored to fulfill then upon reaching Paris on December 3.
One week later he dispatched a letter to Madison
l Ma..1...0
1
..,....
. . ,e, pp. 250-251.

2

Peterson, p.

751.

w~ich

35
contained conclusions

mation

fro~

he

had reached after gleaning infor-

French officials.

Livingston believed that the

Louisiana cession had taken place although Talleyrand only
adr:1itted that it "had been a subject of conversation but
nothing had been concluded, or even resolved on in that
affair.

'3

1

In this conversation, and others, French Minister

Talleyrand

re~ained

uncommunicative and thus

ministry less effective.
Madison

contin~ed

to

ma~Livingston's

For this reason Jefferson and

cond~ct

their negotiations through the

Fre:Jch charg{ Pichon, w~o translated the A::1erican position
so effectively to Talleyrand that the need to forward explicit
instructions to

Livin~st0n

was lesse:;.ed.4

1.-Thile serving as _4rnerice.n I. :inister to France, Livingston's
negotiations suffered

fro~

inadequate instructions and poor

relations with the French Minister of the Exterior Affairs,
;~onsie~r

de Talleyrand.

Insufficient instructions from the

President and Secretary of State plagued Livingston from
December 1801 to Monroe's arrival in J... pri 1 1803.

~e

American

minister was virtually neglected in the winter of 1801 to

1802 although he was attempting to learn the status of the
Floridas and New Orleans.5

3ASPFR, p. 512.
4Peterson, pp.

751-752.

5Dangerfield, p. 320.
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13, 1802, Livingston sent a copy of the
6 Neither
terms of the Treaty of San Idlefonso to Madison.
On January

the treaty nor French officials clarified whether the
Floridas were included in the cession.
they were and Jefferson agreed.

Livingston believed

In April the President

advised Livingston to press for a French cession of the
Floridas and New Orleans to the U. S. but to take his time
since France could not move ahead with her plans for Louisiana
until Santo Domingo's conquest which, Jefrerson thought,
was some time o.ff.7

Instructions to Livingston remained

the sa-rne in Hay with the exception that he was instructed
to determine what price was acceptable to France for the
Floridas and New Orleans.

8

Kadison told Livingston:

The President wishes you to devote every
attention. to this. object,. and to" be. frequent- ..
and particular in your communications relating
to it.9
No offer was authorized by

Jeff~rson

or Madison and

Livingston, wanting some idea how much to proffer, inquired
of the Secretary of State on July
I

-oASPFR, p.

513.

?Peterson, p. 753.
8

1-~alone,

p.

258.

9A.SP?R, p. 516.

30, 1802:
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I am sorry that you have not communicated to
me what are precisely the utmost limits of the
sum I may ve£6ure to offer in cash, or in our
own demands.

Less than two weeks later Livingston repeated his
request to Madison:
I am very much, however, at a loss, as to
what terms you would consider it as allowable
to offer, if they can be brought to a sale of
the Floridas, either with or without New Orleans:
~7 I may, perhaps, carry my estimate of
them too high;
7 I trust, however, that
you will ~ive m; so;e directions on this head,
and not leave the responsibility of offerin~
too much or too little entirely at my door.- 1

L: ..

r: ...

After learning that the Floridas were not ceded to
France in the Treaty of San Idlefonos, the American minister
still sought to learn what offers he could make.

Writing

to Madison on November 2, 1802, Livingston implored:
I therefore pray you to be explicit in your
instructions, and in your replies to sone
questions that I have asked you relative to this
subject in my former letters, since I ar.1 at
present wholly unauthorized as to any offers that
it woulu be proper to make; and we certainly do
not expect to receive this country, or any
interest in it, as a free gift.12

Five

month~

f0llowinc his first appeal regarding the

amount he could offer, Livingston was still awaiting instructions
lOASPFR, p. 520.

11
12

1bid., p. 520.
Ibid., p.

526.

J8
in December when he wrote, ttPray be explicit in the amount
of what I may offer ••• n 1 3
Neither Jefferson or Kadison responded to these requests
ar:d no new major instructions (;a"'ne froJTl
from May 1802 to February 1803.
Livingston

s~ared

Washington D. v.

Jn late January 1803

his feelings of alienation:

As to myself, I a.in left wholly ·.-Ji thout any
precise instruction ho·.,,; to act, or i.·.-t&.tto
offer.
I confess to you I see very little use for
a minister ~ere, ~here there is but one will
and that ~ill governed by no object but
personal security and personal a~bition:
were it left to my discretion, I should
bring ~atters to some positive issue, or
leave them, which would be the only neans
of bri~ging t~em to an issue.14

•'I

Only when I'ionrce arrived did Livingston acquire
additio~al

instructio~s.

The possible reasons for an absence

of explicit instructions· are
~ay

have had no new

nwnero~s.

info~nation

Jefferson and :MaC.ison

to share with Livingston.

Without unconditional confirmation of the cession and
absolute knowledge of its extent, Livingston's original

instructions remained adequate.

As will be seen, Livingston's

relationship with Talleyrand was not amiable and

~~6refore

the President and Secretary of State provided the French
charg{ Pichon with information which was efficiently transmitted to Talleyrand thereby eliminating Livingston as a

l3ASPFR, p. 528.
-i.+Ibi• d • , p •

111

530.

'
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necessary intermediary.
believed they had time to
cession.
~ntil

Finally, Jefferson and Hadison
~esolve

the problems of the

France could not proceed to colonize Louisiana

French control

~ad

been restored on Santo Domingo.

Meanwhile, Livinsston sensed an urgency to the situation;
the knerican minister believed that the need to confirm

the cession 5[1d resolve any proble:ns sterr..ming from it was
immediate.

This variance in attitudes created friction

between Livingston and his superiors in Washington D. C.
George Dangerfield explains:

In Washington, the te~dency was to behave as
if everything could be settled in ti~e, but
always to brandish, as it were, behind one's
back, some half-concealed thunderbolt:
in
Paris, the Minister's p0remptcry c~aracter
cornpel1ed him to act as ir there was almost
no ti~e lefto
In the end, these tendencies
were united in a mutual triur1p:1:
but the
misunderstand~nGS engendered by them ~ere acute
and lasting.l.?
Livingston felt an urgency to complete negotiations
but experienced
tedious.

~rustration

as he found his schedule was

Monday evenings were spent at

~adame

de Forza's

and on Tuesdays were receptions at the Second and Third
Consuls.

Every Wednesday a reception was held at Monsieur

de Talleyrand's and on Thursday the "gralld circle rr :·;as held
at the First or Seco~d Consul's.

Friday ~aw a r~ception at

Livingston's own legation in the rue Truden with Saturday

lSDangerfield, p. 32).
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providing the occasion for a party at either the Minister's
of War or the Minister 1 s of the Interior residence.

At least

two days each month, every diplomat was expected to attend
the parade at the Tuileries Rt noon followed by the levee

5 p.m.,

dinner at 5:30 and a reception lasting
at least until 11 p.m. when the First Counsul departed. 16
from 2 p.m. to

Considering these social events

time-conslli~ing,

tedious

and unproductive, Livingston sought opportunities for serious
negotiation.

\~1en

time was so precious and results so meager,

the Arnerican minister experienced anxieties unknown to those
separated from the scarcity of opportunity by anocean
spanning thousands of miles.

The success or failure of

Livingston's d1ploma_cy was compressed into a few encounters.
The absence .. of explicit ins true tions· can be· attributed ·
to several reasons:

a lack of inrormation, the adequacy

of Livingston's initial instructions of September 1801,
-.· ·. ·Pichon' s avai.1 ::::"l;i-1.i't.y .. ·~.d~~· Liv1ng.ston' s different att.i tude
towar·d time

·~s

-

.
r.~<:·1npa1·tHl

to that of Jefferson and

~adison.

Despite this handicap, Livingstori attempted to acquire
information concerning the extent of the cession.

In June

1802 he received a response to a letter he had written to the
Spanish ambassador to France, Chevalier D'Azara on May 28,

ieo1.

According to the Spanish ambassador the Floridas had

not been ceded but negotiations for them were still underway

16 Dangerfield, p. 340.

"
(
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between France and Spain. 17

On July 3 Talleyrand hinted

to Livingston that Florida was·not yet French.

18

In addition to securing information about the extent
of the cession, Livingston tried to ascertain whether the
United States retained the right secured by the Pinckney
Treaty to navigate the Mississippi River. 19

Livingston

inquired of Talleyrand on February 20, 1802 whether the
cession affected the American right

to

navigate the
Mississippi but the question went unanswered. 20 However,
by February 26, 1802, Livingston had obtained assurance from
a friend of the First Counsul that it was not the French
intention ''to obstruct the navigation of the Mississippi, or
to violate our treaty with Spain. 1121
Concern that with the cession Arnericam might be denied
their right of deposit at New Orleans conpelled Madison to
write to Livingston on May 1, 1802:
If a possession of the mouth of the Mississippi
is to be added to other causes of discord, the worst
events are to be apprehended.22

17 ASPFR, p. ,519.
18 nangerfield, p. 329.
19 ASPFR, pp. 510-511.
2 0ibid., p.

21

514.

Ibid., p • .513.

22 Ibid., p.

516.
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To determine the status of the right of navigation
and deposit Livingston wrote to Chevalier DtAzara on May 28,

ieo2.

Spain had assured the United States that no other nation

would share the right to DQVigate the River unless by convention.
Spain had agreed not to

~ra~~-~avigation

understanding on this subject with the U.
wanted to be assured that

violatedo 2 3

t~e

rights without some

s.

Livingston also

right of deposit had not been

He su.mrned up his request to D'Azara by saying:
11
l

You ~ill easily see, sir, that if a naked
cession has been made to France, without
attention to these articles, how much reason
the United States will have to complain of
the measure.24

'j
.I
I

"

Chevalier D'Azara admitted that although the Floridas
were not included in the cession, but he provided no insight

into the A.r.1erican rights of navigation and deposit. 25

1~ot

until July JOth did Livingston forward to Kadison information
acquired from the Spanish minister to Charles Pinckney.

Livingston's note bore the following co::mr1ent:

If the King should think proper to cede
Louisiana, he will take care that the interest
of the United States shall not be affected
by it.26
It was a feeble assurance and the reply was not even
frank enough to reveal the existence of the cession.

~fuile

D'Azara confirmed the cession by saying the Floridas were not

2 3ASPFR, p. 518.
24T .. d

~·'

2

C:l8
p. ,.,.,
•

5Ibid, p. 519.

2 6Ibid., p.

519. -
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included, other Spanish and French officials failed to admit
the cession even following Livingston's dispatch of a copy

of the treaty to Madisonl
Another problem besetting Livingston was the strained
relationship with the French Minister of Exterior Affairs,
E~onsieur

de Talleyrand, with ·whom he 1vas compelled to work

closely.
Talleyrand disliked not only Livingston but all
Americans because of their role as outspoken critics and
victirri.s of the infarn.ous XYZ a.ffair during John Adams' s
Administration.

Fleeing from the French Terror, Talleyrand

had spent months in the United States.

or

all the men he rnet

while in America, he had been impressed only with the

aristocratic Alexander Hamilton. 2 7

Not only did Livingston

need to negotiate with a minister with a distaste for
Americans but in order for his Y"lission to be successful, he
had to dedicate himself to forestalling Talleyrand's and
Napoleon's efforts to establish a French empire in North America.
To both these persons the possession of Louisiana was essential

to French expansion and empire.
I

describes the situation in
2

7Dangerfield, P·

2s1bid., p. 314.

313.

28

George Dangerfield

which Livingston was placed:

44
J

To extract concessions from the hostility of
Talleyrand and the imperial dre2.llls of the Consul
would have been difficult enough if Livingston
had-been given adequate powers: if he had had,
that is to say, something definite and valuable
to offer, As it was--with his deafness, his
inadequate French, his l3ck of advisers--he
could not have seemed a very significant
personage. Talleyrand, beneath his exquisite
amenity of address, trought to his dealings with
Li vine;s ton a painful ar rriory of almost i111perceptible
snubs and frail but deadly sarcas~s. Behind the
.A111erican Einister, after a11, there loorried neit:ier
armies, nor navies, nor wealth; neither the power
to browbeat nor the means to bribe: he had only
that indefinable something, that vague but vast
threat, the future United States.29
The future of the United States was an intangible asset

but a

~ore

tangible advantage· held by Livingston in his

dealings with Talleyrand was that the A.."'nerican usimply did
not conceive that any man was a finer social specimen than
himself."_

~1is.belief.in

his personal value led to Livingston's

persistence in pressing concessions and mentioning French
debts.JO

Livingston relentlessly insisted that both France

and Spain might mutually benefit by ceding the Floridas
to the u. s.3 1

On DecembeP 11, 1801 Livingston mentioned to Talleyrand
that the cession of the Floridas and New Orleans could serve
as a•way of paying French debts to the
29D anger l. 1 e d
.t:t.

,

..!..

,

p. 319.

30ibid., pp. 320-321.
JlASPFR, p. $12.

u.

S.

Talleyrand
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replied, " ••• none but spendthrifts satisfy their debts by

/

selling their lands.n

Again Tal1eyrand maintained that

the Floridas and New Orleans were not French and therefore
Hnot ours to give.n3 2
Nine days later the Arr:erican minister was again unsure
whether the cession had even taken place but from formal
interviews and inforreal receptions had-absorbed the temper
of

plans and concluded that if France had obtained

Bo~aparte's

the Floridas in exchange for Parma and Piacenza, she would
never cede

t~em

to anyone; Bonaparte was intoxicated with

his plans for a western e~pire.33
French cebts were frequently mentioned by the .A.rnerican
minister.
seizures

Th.ese American claims were for embargoes, the

or

cargoes in French ports and arbitrary-purchases

accumulated from 1793 to 1800 and not canceled by the Convention
of 1800.
~ith

Legitimate claims may have amounted to $5,000,000

American citizens entering into partnership with French

citizens considered denationalized as far as claims were

co~cerned.34

In response to Livingston's continual references

to these claims, French officials admitted the justice of
of claims but did not pay them.

32 ASP FR ,

p•

5-2
J. _ •

33Dangerfield, p. 341.

34Ibid., p. 323.

How ably Livingston used
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this issue of American claims is described by Dangerfield:

Livingston continued to show a singular
fertility in arguments and schemes for settling
the claims: but, as time went on, he regarded
them more and more as a form o.f pressure, a way
of making himself felt ~1en he addressed himself
to the far greater problem Dresented by the
~ retrocession of Louisiana.3~
The claims issue was pressed until the Louisiana
Purchase was completed.

In April 1803 Livingston's adamancy

alienated James Monroe when he assumed his post as Minister
Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary.

The claims issue

was resolved in the Claims Convention of 1803 but Livingston's
argumentative intercourse with claims commission members
and his support for Americans posses.sing questionable claims

damaged the American minister's reputation.3 6
On February 20, 1802 Livingston wrote to Talleyrand

to inquire again whether a financial arrangement concerning
the Floridas could be drawn up between France and the U. S.
The agreement would aid French operations while removing
t'-rrtu.re··causes of discontent between France and the U.

s.

since

the Floridas and New Orleans constituted a part of America's
strong natural boundary.37
The supposed irony that Livingston was.willing to provide
France with revenue which would be allotted toward Leclerc's
35Dangerfield, p. 324.

3 6 Ibid., p. 387.
37ASPFR, p •

.514.
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military expedition in Santo Domingo

disa~pears

when the

feedback Livingston acquired from French officials and
Rufus King is examined.

In a letter dated February 26, 1802,

to Madison, Livingston pointed out that the establisr.ilTlent
of an empire in the west was unacceptable to every French
statesman since too many men and too much money were required
to effect a policy inimical to the United

~tates

and of no

advantage to France.

The committment, then, was superficial

on the part of many.

However, since the dream of a western

empire was Napoleon Bonaparte's, the grandiose scheme was
~s

supported.J

From Rufus King, Livingston learned that Leclerc was
having many difficulties securing Santo Domingo.

The British

Foreign Secretary, Lord Eawkesbury, had suggested to King
that if Leclerc's army were destroyed, and Hawkesbury thought
this likely, a successive expedition would fail also.

For

this reason IJivti\g~i--i:.on r:c)ss·es-sed fewer qualms about offering

money to Franc>}

t...;h i r.h

wou.1 d in all likelihood be allocated

toward outfitting and sustaining a new, and probably dooffied,
expedition to Santo Domingo.3 9

Even as late as May ieo2, six months after Livingston's
arrival in Paris, Talleyrand refused to bargain and nturned
into a sphinx at the mention of Louisiana.4°

38 ASP FR , p • 513 •
39Dangerfield, p.

328.

40Peterson, pp. 750-754.

Up to September
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1802 Talleyrand was generally uncommunicative.
With Talleyrand eliminated as a useful source of
information and a viable negotiating force, Livingston
turned to his friend of many years, Barbt-Marboi&: Marbois
and Livingston had known each other in Philadelphia during
the American Revolution.

It was for Marbois's personal

instruction that Thomas Jefferson had written his Notes on
Jirginia published in 17135. 4l

In i·ro5 Marbois was assigned

to the French legation in Philadelphia from whence Loui·s XVI
appointed him Intendant to Santo Domingo.

Imprisoned in 1793

and later exiled to French Guiana for two years fon his polit.
1 views,
.
B arce-1•1aroo1s
.,,., / ...... , .
ica
in 1800 was appointed Minister of

the Treasury by Napoleon.

He assisted Napoleon with French

finances_ and interpreted. for the First ··Co.nsul Toussant-.
L'Ouverture's behavior in Santo Domingo.4 2 In the final
negotiations.of the Louisiana Purchase, Marbois replaced
Talleyrand.

However in December 1801 Marbois was evasive

and Livingston wrote to Madison on December.31:
Marbois told me yesterday it was considered
important to have an outlet for their turbulent
spirits; yet would not explicitly acknowledge
that the business had been concludea.43

41 sprague,
42 Ibid.,

p. 281.

p. 281.

43ASPFR, p. 513.
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Not only would Marbois receive the res·ponsibili ty to
conduct the final negotiations but in April

1803 his advice

to Napoleon reflects a change in opinion as he encouraged the
cession of Louisiana to U1e

n.

S.

Louisiana's importance to

France had become negligible.

I

Besides Talleyrand and

~arbois,

Livingston sought to

ingratiate himself with Napoleon Bonparte.

Aware of

Bonaparte's aversion to democrats, Livingston assumed the role
of an aristocrat.

He refurbished the rue Tournon legation

to provide a regal sumptuousness.

Under the tutelage of

Marbois and Pierre du Pont, the American minister attended
balls, banquets and salons where politicians close to
Bonaparte were likely to be present.

The purchase of a

cocked hat and a winged collar made Livingston's attire
appropriate for a wolf hunt organized by Napoleon's brother,
Joseph Bonaparte.44
To curry Napoleon's favor, Livingston, when he heard
that General Leclerc's wife, Pauline, was suffering greatly
from the

h~~idity

in Santo Domingo, offered his brother

Edward's townhouse in New York or another in Clermont for
Pauline Lee lerc' s use.

Brother Edv;ard Livings ton was the

mayor of New York City and Pauline 1 s refusal may have
preserved the propriety of these New York Livingstons since
44sprague, p.

283.
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she was whispered to be the mistress of a number of celebrities,
including Napoleon!45
For all his efforts Livingston's behavior did not
radically alter the negotiations and was of secondary
importance compared to .ftF.erica 1 s threa-:8ned alliance with
Britain, Leclerc 1 s successes and failures in Santo Domingo,
and the French need for revenue.

'1-fnile Lj_vingston tried to placate Napoleon, approach
Talleyrand, and learn the nature and extent of the cession,
he also received the

~elp

of one Dupont de Nemours.

Dupont,

who had come to the U. S. in 1799 and was a personal friend
of Thomas Jefferson's, was returning to France in.April 1802.
Before leaving the U. S., Dupont offered his services to
Jefferson on the subject of Louisiana since he was eager
for
U.

a

settlement mutually advantageous to France and the

s.4 6

April

Dupont was entrusted with the important letter of

18, 1802 in which the President responded to the rum0r

that Spain had ceded Louisiana to France. ·His belief that
such a transaction made France a nnatural and habitual enemy"

to the

u. s.

and provided cause for an Anglo-American alliance

shocked Dupont.47

The points unaerscored by Jefferson for

Dupont's benefit were:

the cession of

~ew

Orleans and the

Floridas was "palliative 11 only; repossession of Louisiana

45sprague, p. 283.

4 6 Peterson,

pp. 752-753.

47Jefferson, P• 311.
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would destroy French sea

and consequently appropriate

~ower

all of k1:erica to Sri tain and the U. S.; and the New World ·

no longer a plaything to be used for

~as

T1:e stunned Duporit reco::-:1mended

pasttir'!es.

offer to purchase New Orleans and the
1--l•-l
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the French

r;overn::--::e!lt t!.l.e "inevitable c.onsequencesn of possessing
Lauisiana.
S~.!i;;

Stating that

~e

highly valued ''a state of friend-

between France and usn and '2e desired peace, Jefferson

explained

t~e

explosive natu:>e of this seemingly insignificant

event:
I~ ~Llrope,

not~ing

but

E~rope

is

~een,

or

supposed to have any righ~ in t~e affairs of
nations; but this little event, of ~ranee's
possession h9rself of Lou~siana, whic~ is
t~rown in as nothi~e, as a mere ~ake-~eight in
~he general settlenent of accounts,--t~is speck
~'\-hich now appears as &n almost in'1isible poir..t

·in the horizon, is the embryo of a torr..ado ',·jhich
~ill burst on the countries on both sides of the
tl +. l
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Althoush extremely useful in France,
to

~ediate

);apoleon,
o~

successfully there.
CO!T.C-~:.micated

was unable

He obtained an audience with

with Talleyra:ld and r-.:.:'d.D-'cained the hopes

Jefferson and Madison for a

43Peterson, pp. 7~3
? - ~~4
tj •
49Jefferson, pp.
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negotia~ej

settle~ent ~hile
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Livingston became increasingly impatient.So

Even with

Monroe's appoint~ent in early 1803, Jefferson sought to
retain Dupont's assistance in representing America's
position.5

1

Jefferson had shared his secret request to

Dupont only with Madison.

When the Secretary of State

referred to the President's letters to Dupont in his
instructions. to. Jv:onroe, Thomas Jefferson objected:

As that correspondence will make no part of
the public record, perhaps it is as well it
should not be spoken of in them.52
On November 1, 1803 Jefferson wrote personally to
Dupont thanking him for his assistance.53

His efforts had

been in vain; he had expended much energy in a situation
demanding industry and diplomacy.

Dupont's voice did not

by itself bring about the Louisiana Purchase but served to
vocalize an alternative which France elected when the dreams
of a western empire collapsed.
Up to April 1802 neither
• • • :.;

...

Dupont nor Livingston were

•• l

so effective as to force the French to alter their foreign
policy.

An absence of precise and frequentinstructions and

the unwillingness of French and Spanish officials to admit

50 Peterson,
1

p.

5 Jefferson, p.

754.
348.

Koch, Jefferson & Nadison:
T.~e Great
Collaboration (New York:
Oxford un1vers1~y Press, 1950), p. 237.

52 Adrienne
r3

~ Jefferson,

p. 422.
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the cession hampered Livingston's diplomacy.
Despite these setbacks, Robert.Livingston renewed

J

his negotiating efforts.

He employed novel techniques,

took advantage of every situation and forcefully represented
American concerns and interests to French officials.
This persistence demonstrated American opposition to French
foreign policy and her willingness to agree to some monetary

arrangement which preserved American interests and allowed
American expansion westward.

l
\

'
I
I

I

\
I

I
I

CllAPTER V

THE ENERGETIC

LIVI~GSTON

Between Kay 1802 and February 1803 Robert Livingston
attempted to overcome the handicaps of insufficient instructions and troublesome relations with l{'rench officials by
various means:
a~

~p~eal

~ufus

publication of a memorial in August 1802,

to Joseph Bonaparte,

1~ing.

an~

correspondence with

These activities, plus events in Santo Domingo

and New Orleans, contributed to Livingston's loss of status
anC. necessitated the joint appointment cf James T-1onroe as .
a minister to France.

J

In March-1802

~adison

received a letter from Livingston

who described prevailing French attitudes and ideas concerning
Louisiana.

The French considered the area the most fertile

in the world with New Orleans so strategically located £hat

she commanded the trade of America's entire western country.
The Indians were depicted as Francophiles especially by one
Frenchman, Francis Tatergem, who considered himself very
influential with the Creek nations of the South.

Although

Livingston considered him a mere adventurer, the First Consul
!

believed Tatergem's estimates that an army of twenty thousand

l..
I

Creek warriors, filled with hatred for Ame1·icans, could

l

i

l_;.
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easily be raised.

1

Tne Creek Indians would contribute to

the fulfillment of Napoleon's dream.

Livingston wrote:

It is a darling objec,t with the First Consul,
who sees in it a mean to ~~atify his friends, and
to dispose of his arm}P,s.
While napoleon was musing over the possibility o.f
recruiting the Creek Indians, France and Spain were still
negotiating over the Floridas.

France believed the cession

included the Floridas and wanted Spain to reverse her
interpretation o.f the cession which excluded them.

With

the situation in flux, Livingston had tried to secure
instructions from Washington D.

In his letter to l(adison
th~t

01-! }~ay

c.

but none were received.

28, 1802 Livingston asserted

if he failed to hear from the Secretary of State or

the President soon he would present a memorial to France.3
The American diplomat wrote:
I wait impatiently some further instructions
from you; those I have, in some sort prohibiting
such measures as may show any dissatisfaction on
the subject, of 1'\rhich,, however, I doubt the policy.
The subject is so interesting as to induce us to
risk something to defeat it.4

Apparently no instruction prohibiting the memorial
arrived to prevent its publication.
1

ASPFR, p.

515.

Ibid., p.

515.

3Ibid., p.

518.

2

4Ibid., p. 518.

During the surmner
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Livingston prepared the memorial, made twenty copies and
distributed them among Napoleon's advisers.5
he addressed

hi~self

ln the memorial

to the status of the Floridas and

problems resulting from a French colonization of Louisiana.
Livingston proposed that the United States purchase
the Floridas.

Referring to the negotiations underway between

Spaip and France the American minister concluded:
I speak in all this business as if the affair
of the Floridas was arranged with Spain; which I
believe is not yet the case.6

Livingston apparently believed France might one day
possess the Floridas since his memorial sought to discourage
French colonization of not only the Floridas but of Louisiana.
He argued that France's population was too small to require
colonization~and

available_French

for colonial investment.

capita~

was insufficient

Since ,,transmarine colonies add

nothing to the strength of a nation," it was to Francets
benefit to invest her capital in home manufactures.

At

present French possessions in the West Indies and Cayenne
were more than sufficient to satisfy French and European
demands.

With western expansion these French colonies would

need to be made more productive thereby creating another
demand on French capital. 7

5ASPFR,

p. 520.

6 Ibid., p. 520.
?Ibid., p. 520.

I
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In addition to the problem of insufficient capital,

Louisiana's climate required slave labor.

These slaves

would need to be fed, clothed and maintained for many years
before their work was profitable.

The profit would be in

greater peril since such slaves, living near the wild forests
and natives of North America, would frequently escape. 8
Even if France decided to invest her capital in Louisiana,
the investment would not yield quick returns and would be
unstable due to the unreliable work force.
To colonize Louisiana would not be profitable to
France or the West Indies.

If France introduced her products

into Louisiana, she would only reduce tne price of items
imported from the islands and would, Livingston insisted,
find herself destroying these products since quantity decreases
value.

A greater expense would befall France if she chose

to grow in Louisiana those crops, such as rice, which were
profitably being raised on the islands.

At the present

the West Indies secured lumber from the Northern States and
paid with molasses and a West lndian rum called "tafia".
This trade was inexpensive to the island planters.

If the

planters were forced to buy wood from Louisiana, their costs
would increase and the market for ru..111 and molasses would end
since these are consumed only in the Northern States.

8

ASPFR, p. 521.

The

J

5ff

exi~ting

balance of trade would be destroyed. 9

Livingston responded to the argument that Louisiana
offered additional markets to French manufacturers by asserting
thatthe French emigrant to Louisiana would consume less in
the New World than he had in the Old.

The consurnption of

manufacturing goods among the slaves would be smaller yet.

Inhabitants already living in Louisiana make many of their

own products or rely upon Britain for necessary articles.
Therefore French manufacturers would .find it difficult to
introduce their products §ince the demand for their goods
does not exist.

Not only would such products be difficult

to introduce, but travel through the Gulf into the mouth of
the Mississippi and upriver was dangerous, slow and expensive.
Overland transportation of goods through canals and on roads
was faster ana cheaper and these two factors provided
American and British goods with advantages over French product&lO
Finally, the American minister addressed himself to the
consequences of a French occupation of New Orleans.

Since

one-third of the mercantile houses in New Orleans were owned
by U. S. citizens, these houses would be removed if a French
military govern.rrient were established there.

American merchants

i.·..rould relocate to a site in agreement with the terms of the
Pinckney Treaty· or to Natchez which would become a free port
9ASl'FH, pp. ·521-522.

lOibid •' p. 523.

i
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receiving any vessel that could enter New Orleans.

11

Arter declaring that France possessed insufficient
capital, that French development of Louisiana would be
disruptive to French possessions, and that French manufac-

I

turers would obtain no profits by attempting to sell their
products in Louisiana, Livingston then contradicted himself
.when describing the economic success France could achieve
in Louisiana if she agreed to cede New Orleans to the U.
~1en,

s.

by using the Mississippi River to transport her products,

French commodities could be successfully introduced when
t~e

inhabitants developed a preference for them over British

goods.

These French goods would need to be cheaper.

This

would be accomplished by interesting American merchants in

the sale of these products, by elliploying the capital of
fu~erican

merchants, and by altering the American consumers'

preference for British goods.

12

Suddenly traveling upriver

on the Mississippi was commercially proI'itable, the

haz~rds

and slow progress l-1ere immediately overcome and forgotten

and the intractable tastes of the inhabitants were easily
changed.
The memorial was circulated languidly among Bonaparte's
advisers.

1

3

Despite this dissertation and other proposals,

llASPFR, p.

12
1

524.

Ibid., p. 524.

3nangerfield, p. 337.
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they informed Livingston that every offer was premature
and the French goverD.L~ent remained determined to take
possession of Louisiana.

The fulfillment of Napoleon's

dreaJn of a weste:rn empire was nee.:rer with Leclerc' s military
successes and, therefore, the impact of the memorial was not
as great as the Ar:1erican minister had hoped.
expressed his frustration in his letter of
to

Livingston

Septe~ber·l,.1802

}~adi son:

There never was a Government in which less could
be done by negotiation than here.
There is P-o
people, no legislature, no counsellors.
One man
is everything. He seldom asks advice, and never
hears it unasked. His ministers are mere clerks;
and his Legislature and Counsellors parade officers. 14
Following the distribution of his memorial, Livingston
received a letter from Thomas Jefferson who encouraged him
not to be impetuous in his relations with French officials.
Jefferson recommended that all communications with the French
should be of a ''mild, complaisant, and even friendly complexion,
but always independent.' 11 5

Jefferson continued:

Ask no favors, leave small and irritating things
to be conducted by the individuals interested in
them, interfere ourselves but in the greatest cases,
and then not push them to irritation. No matter at
present existing between them and us is important
enough to risk a breach of peace; peace being indeed
the most important of all things for us, except the
preserving an erect and independent attitude.
Although I know your own judgment leads you to
pursue this line identically yet I thought it just
l4ASPFR, p.1

525.

5Jefferson, pp.

335-336.
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to ~igengthen it by the concurrence of my
own.
Perhaps word of Livingston's frustration had been
relayed to Jefferson or Madison who interpreted the memorial
as aggressive diplomacy and evidence of Livingston's impatience.
BeforG +-.1-:ii.s

.1.A~.t.er

reached Livingston, the frustrated

American diplomat, realizing that his negotiating efforts
were being seriously impeded by Talleyrand, was trying to
discover another person with whom business could be conducted.
On October 26, 1802 Livingston enjoyed an interesting conversation with Joseph Bonaparte who expressed his willingness
to receive any unsigned and informal comrnunications. 1 7
Joseph Bonaparte was described by George Dangerfield as:
••• a lazy and somewhat hypocritical personage,
who had, none the less, the ear of his brother, a~§
who was ready to intermedd le- in· affairs of·- State·. Saving secured the attention of Napoleon's brother,
Livingston attempted to learn how much Joseph knew about the
.~,~~nown

and possibly changing, status of the Floridas by

inqui1·li1g whether all obstacles might not be overcome if
~ranee

returned Louisiana to Spain but retained New Orleans.

New Orleans could then be added to the Floridas and ceded to
the United States in return for the assumption by the U. S •

..

~f

American claims against France.
16

Jefferson, pp.

l7Dangerfield, p.

lBibid., p.

338.

335-336.
339.

Joseph Bonaparte failed
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to reply but asked Livingston if Americans preferred the
Floridas over Louisiana.

By November 1802

Livingston responded affirmatively. 19

~alleyrand

disclosed to the omnipresent

Livingston that the provisions of the Pinckney Treaty would
be respected by the French.

Livingston was dubious.

The

status of the Floridas was finally disclosed as not included
in the cession; affairs in Europe grew more unstable
the Peace of Amiens became shaky. 2

°

and

France was still negotiating

for the Floridas and offered to sell Parma to Spain for
1~8,000,000

livres ($18,240,000) or exchange Parffia for the

Floridas.

Livingston concluded in a letter dated November 14,

1802:to Madison:
You see by tnis the value they put on Florida
I fear Spain will accede to their proposition.21
From December 1 to December

24, 1802 Livingston

initiated a new series of negotiations which combined

t

fantasy with statesmanship.

Approaching Joseph Bonaparte first,

Livingston presented his unique proposal.

Believing it reason-

able to assu."'ne that Napoleon Bonaparte i-:ould be raised to a

higher rank,

~ith

his new imperial title becoming a hereditary

one, and recognizing that national ingratitude and domestic
l9DangerI'ield, p. 339.
20 Tb . . .,
-=--2:.£ • ' p • 3')9
...) •

2lASPFR, p.

527.

/
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\

convulsions were counte·rparts of politics, Bonaparte's family
might some day require a haven.

Therefore, a permanent

establishment for the first Consul's family could be the
land including New Orleans and the strip of province lying
east of the Mississippi including West Florida.

The First

Consul's family would own the land but the territory would
be under the jurisdiction of the United States.

In return

for receiving jurisdictional rights, the U. S. would grant
France certain commercial advantages such as placing the
French trade at New Orleans on an equal standing with American
trade.

If agreeable to the First Consul, Livingston,

without possessing the proper authority to do so, offered
to pay $2,000,000 either in money or U.

6% interest~for

s.

stock paying

New Orleans and ~est Florida. 22

Joseph Bonaparte rejected Livingston's rationale since
it affected the Bonaparte family, but agreed to send to
Napoleon a postscript proposing the cession of New Orleans
and West Florida as far east as the Perdido River to the
United States.

To compensate France for the loss of New Orleans,

a French port could be constructed at Leon directly opposite
New Orleans.

In the cession would also be an area lying

west of the Mississippi River and above the mouth of the Arkansas
River.

The ceded territory west of the River would calm
22

Dangerfield, p.

341.

/
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American apprehensions by preventing an alliance in North
America between Great Britain and France. 2 3
The next note Livingston wrote Joseph Bonaparte contained no references to a familial haven but repeated the
proposal of a French cession of New Orleans, West Florida
and the land above the mouth of the Arkansas River to the

U. S.

New Orleans was described as being of little advantage

to the French since tne area possessed a naked bank, no port,
basin or quay for shipping and no strong fortifications.
If war broke out, Great Britain could easily seize West
Florida and Louisiana, add them to her possessions, and
with her powerful navy proceed to nannihilate the external
trade of every other nation in Europe.n

This fate could be

avoided if France made the cession to the U. S., fortified
Pensacola and Tampa, or left them under Spanish control.
Tne wisest decision France could make would be to not only
include West Florida in the cession but to pledge, without
delivery of title or possession, East Florida for a certain
n~~ber

of years in order to satisfy a portion of the American

claims. 24
Livingston, believing these letters would alter
Napoleon's position revealed his enthusiasm in a dispatch
23DangerI'ield, P·
24Ibid., p. 343.

342.
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to Madison:
I have, in a private nemoir under the Consul's
eye, touched a string that has alarmed them. I
cannot now explain. The minister knows nothing
of this ••• It is an important card in my hands,
and must, for the gresent at least, be somewhat
under my control.2j
Livingston was hopeful until January 7, 1803 when
Joseph Bonaparte informed him that in the future he must
26
address himself to Talleyrand.
The new series of r.egotiations
halted as Livingston was forced once more to appeal to
the uncooperative Talleyrand.

vl:1en in early January,

Livingston heard that the right of deposit at New Orleans
had been revoked, he wrote immediately to the French minister
and decried the closure as an unfortunate circ:.unstance occurring

at the moment when France was planning to possess Louisiana.
The French- silence ·as to·· her intentions in- Louisiana·, -Livingston wrote, "will (I very much fear) give room to jealous
and suspicious persons to suppose that the court of Spain
has, in this instance, acted in concurrence with that of
France."

Livingston then suggested a way for France to

remove herself from this difficulty.

25ASPFR, p. 528.
26

nangerfield, p.

345.

Knowing that France did
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not possess the Floridas, Livingston stressed that Louisiana,
without the Floridas, was worthless. 2 7
France could cede to the U. S. that part of Louisiana
lying above the mouth of the Arkansas River and thereby
establish a buffer area between French possessions and
Canada.

France would retain the area west of the Mississippi
-

and south of the Arkansas River as a barrier between the
and Mexico.

u. s.

France would own East Florida as far east

as the Perdido River with the U.

s.

acquiring West Florida,

New Orleans and the territory on the left bank of the
I

Mississippi.

As for New Orleans, Livingston threatened that

l
I

s.

the U.

could easily develop Leon if the French retained

!
f

New Orleans.

Leon would receive the capital now invested in

I

New Orleans and New Orlean's value to France would be destroyed. 28'·
In closing, Livingston suggested that should France
not take advantage of ceding certain territories to the
American States, the U. S. might still be forced to make an
allianee with Britain.
sin~e

England was increasing in power

her recent looting of India had given her much capital

which, invested in an industrial revolution, wouia make her
u~timately

victorious over Napoleon.

this threat of alliance, Livingston
2

7 A,SPFR, P • 531.

28

rbid., P• 531.

To give credence to
~ade

marked diplomatic
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advances to Lord Whitworth, the British Ambassador in France. 2 9
Talleyrand's responses were not encoura~ing.

Livingston

was .faced with the diplomatic ba1. . riers he.· l. had encountered
so .frequently in the past.

These barriers and Livingston's

subsequent impatience had compelled him to turn to Rufus King,
hoping that through him sympathy for American demands could
be aroused at Whitehall.30

As early as December 30, 1801,

Livingston was corresponding with King and relating to him
the possible consequences of the rumored cession of Louisiana
from Spain to France.

Livingston hoped to strike a responsive

chord by pointing out that with French expansion into the
New World, not only would English possessions be endangered
but Britain as well.

Therefore, the English would do well by

trying-to-prevent-a-final·settlement·0f the ce~sion.3 1
King's reply was written seventeen days later.

He

had tried to impress a number of English leaders with the
consequences of the cession but Britain, desiring peace,
would not interfere.

Although England ·would demonstrate

"no open measure of opposition,n since

t~at

"would afford

a Pretence to involve her in new difficulties," she would
throw impediments in the way of its completion.3 2
2 9Dangerfield, p. 347.
30Peterson, pp.

751-752.

31 ASPFR, p. 512.
K"
32~'

VO 1 •

4,
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King encouraged Livingston to reveal what

griev~nces

the U. S. would suffer if the cession were completed

a~ud

to

explain tne American hope to live in harmony wi"th France.33
Fearing that his suggestions might offer.dLivingston, King
apologized:
But I have to entreat your Pardon for any
suggestions on wy part upon Subjects which your
superior Judgment and experience are much more
capable than mine to conduct.34

In March 1802 Livingston was still encouraging
participation at

Amie~s.

British

This time he referred to the potential

problems of an unsettled boundary between Canada

~nd

Louisiana

if the French acquired Louisiana.35
This correspondence between King and Livingston drew
the attention of the President and the Secretary of State.
Kadison's brusque letter of ~a~ch 16, 1802 reacted to the
poor judgment used by Livingston in his letter of December JO,

1801 to Rufus King, and clearly admonished both of them:
Tne subject of your letter to Mr. King, of
the 30th of December, is regarded by the
President as not less delicate than you have
supposed.· Considering the particular views
which Great Britain may mingle with ours, and
the danger that a confidential resort to
her may be abused, for the purpose of sowing
jealousies in France, and thereby thwart our

33 King,
·
vo 1 •

I
L~,

34Ibid., p. 59.
35ASPFR, p.

sis.

p.

rq
~;

•
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object, you and Mr. King will both be sensible ·
that too much circumspection cannot be employed. 36

Meanwhile, King continued the correspondence with
Livingston.

Although the American government had not sent

instructions concerning the cession to King, he had formulated
opinions which he freely shared with his diplomatic cohort
in France/.37
j

I

On March 23, 1802 King again informed Livingston

I

that Gre~t Britain would not assist the U. S. in matters
regardin$ the cession; America was to be self-reliant.

King

I

suggested that the U. S. might acquire legitimate title to
Louisian~

and the Floridas with a large sum of money since

I

the U. S~ had nothing else:
Noi set of claims; no balancing of accounts; no
prospect of future disadvantage will have any
beneficial influence in our favour.JS
Horever;-even-i~·

it were-possible-to extend· the American·

frontie~ to the Pacific Ocean, this would impose burdens on
I

I

the AmeD,ican people.

The plan, then, would be ill received.

I

King, t1erefore, believed it preferable to secure only
New Orleans
and the Floridas but to do so only through
I
means, fot military.3 9

diplo~atic

By frankly declaring America's intent

to assert her rights and interests and by outlining the possible
I

I

Jb; ASPFR,

p.

3~K.
I _ing,-- vo 1 •

514.

4,

J/Sibid., p. 87 .
.

--

~9Ibid.,

p. 87.

p. 89.
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consequences to France if the U.

S~

failed to acquire

New Orleans and the Floridas, the United States might be
/

successful.40

King concluded with an idea foreshadowing

the Monroe Doctrine of 1823:
The Truth should not be disguised from ourselves
or others; that we are the 1'irst Power in our
own hemisphere, and that we are 1isinclined to
perforrri the part of the second. 4
In a letter dated July 12, 1802 to Livingston, Kiug
continued to examine the subject of the cession and concluded
tha~

tne D.

s.

shou~d

not explicitly sanction it.

and the Floridas remained with Spain they

wou~d

If Louisiana

shortly

imitate the American colonies and become independent.
th8 probable war between
Spain aligned

l:41 rance

h~rself w~th

and

~ngland

France, then

If

resumed and

~nglana

would most

likely succeed in taking possession of New Orleans and
the Floridas.

~ngland wo~ld

then cede them to the

u. s.

Therefore, King advised Livingston to refrain from forming
any cumbersome guarantees with France or any other power for
the purpose oL· securing New Orleans and the Floridas since
these areas were bound to be free in tne near future. 42

40~ing,

41 Ibid.,
42 Ibid.,

vol.

4,

p.

89.

pp.

p.

89.

146-147.

71
This correspondence continued and before departihg for
the United States,Rufus King traveled on the Continent and

c:i~ulted witn Livingston in Paris.43
had not cooperated by creating

Although the British

impedimen~s

had appreciated King's correspondence.

at Amiens, Livingston

King, the Federalist,

and Livingston, the Republican, were able to put aside
partisan differences and combine their intellectual energies

to respond to a problem

aver~to

American interests.

While Livingston was publishing his memorial, conferring
with French officials, and corresponding with Rufus King,
he was careful to verify any rQmors concerning expeditions
to Louisiana.

Prior to April 1802 Livingston had informed

Madison of an expedition under General Victor which reportedly
had been -0rdered- to. Louisiana •. "--Originally. Livingston had been
alarmed but .in April he minimized the danger.

In late May,

Livingston wrote Madison that the expedition had been delayed
until September.44

Again Livingston was relatively uncon- ·

cerned since he was certain that France would finally relinguish bOUisiana and cede New Orleans to the
Americans

u.

s.45

eagerly and anxiously followed General Leclerc's

successes- and setbacks in Santo Domingo. -Believing- that
43Klng, vol.

4,

p. 179.

44ASPFR, pp. 515-518.
45Malone, p. 259.
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Leclerc's work on Santo Domingo would not be accomplished
quickly, Livingston

~ust

have been surprised at the news of

Leclerc's capture of Toussaint L'Ouverture in 1802.

This

news did not urigger the departure of Victor's expedition
from Dunkerque on the Straits of Dover since Charles IV
of Spain had not yet ordered Louisiana delivered to France.
The issuance of the order to deliver on October 15, 1802,
made the French occupation of Louisiana credible.4 6

However,

Livingston on November 11, 1802, told Madison that orders
for the embarkation of Victor's troops had encountered some
diplomatic difficulty regarding

th~

provinces of Parma and

Placentia and the expedition was now preparing to sail from
Holland in approximately twenty days.47

More impediments

to the embarkation followed.
Affairs in Santo Domingo had changed.

General Leclerc's

successes were reversed and the French soldiers confronted
disaster.

Napoleon tried to put off informing the French

people of events in Santo Domingo but on January 7, 1803 he
was finally obliged to publish the account of Leclerc's
death and virtual destruction of his army of 30,000 men from
the fever.

It was impossible for General Victor to relieve

the remainder of Leclerc's army or to retain French control
\

)

46Malone, p. 259.
47ASPFR, p. 526.
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of the island since his expedition was icebound in Helvoet
Sluys in Holland.4

8

Napoleonfs dreams for a western empire

were quickly crumbling and yet he persisted to press Spain
for the Floridas as if thy could be of value although France
·could not even maintain a stronghold on Santo Domingo,
the gateway to Louisiana.
vrnile French soldiers were dying painfully in s·<into
Domingo and Napoleon was impatiently noting their lack of
progress, the Spanish Intendant of New Orleans on October 16,
1802 revoked Americans' right of deposit.49

Ironically on

that sarne day a letter arrived from Dupont de Nemours to
Jefferson revealing that the price of six million dollars
had been named for New Orleans arid the Floridas on the
condition that France received the same comr.1ercial rights

l

as the

u.

s.5o

What was even more ironic was that the

French were ready and willing to sell land that Spain claimed
France did not possess.
The closure of New Orleans sparked an immediate crisis
whose consequences wofrld soon be

f~lt

at the cession negotiations

./
in France.

Through New Orleans from Kentucky, Tennessee,

Mississippi, Ohio and the Indian territories passed produce

48 nangerfield,
49smelser, p.

p.

346.

89.

5oPeterson, p. 755.
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I estimated at $3,000,000 annually.

Another million dollars

in produce came from St. Louis and the Spanish villages
Ste. Genevieve, Arkansas Post, Natchitoches, etc.5

1

In

July the Spanish Intendant, Juan Ventura Morales, acquired
permission from Spain's Charles IV to close the depot if
Morales ever thought it wise.

In the spring of 1802 many

American shippers began to use the deposit privilege as a
cover fort.he smuggling of Spanish gold and silver.

When

Morales asked the shippers to halt the smuggling, they
rejected his authority by informing him that New Orleans was
no longer Spanish but French.

On OctoberJ6, 1802 Morales posted

the notice of the suspension of the right of deposit.

On

October 15 Charles IV had officially conveyed Louisiana to
H1
.1. ranee

52 _
•....
The reaction was i~~ediate.

On October 18, 1802

Governor Claiborne asked James Madison whether another place
of deposit on the banks of the Mississippi had been assigned

by Charles IV since such information could not be ascertained
from the Intendant's proclamation.

It was subsequently learned

that in violation of the Pinckney Treaty with Spain another
location had not been appointed for deposit.5? _
51 Sprague, p.

287.

S2 lbid., p. 288.
53Document 431, State Papers and Correspondence
(Washington D.C.: U. s. Governmen-c Printing Office, 1903),

pp.

55-56.
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According to Governor Claiborne the impact of the
closure was extensive:

It has inflicted a severe wound on the agricultural and commercial interests of this Territory,
and wi11 ~rove no .less injurious to a11· the Western
country. 54The Proclamation did not deny Americans the right
to navigate the Mississippi, but Madison wrote to Charles
Pinckney on November 27, 1802 the following:
It is evident that the useful navigation of
the Mississippi so essentially depends on a suitable depository for the articles of commerce
that a privation of tb? latter is equivalent to
a privation of both."5.:J
~mericans

believed the appointment of a substitute depot

was an incontestable right.

~ot

only were the farmers along

the Mississippi at the mercy of Spain but so were those along
the Mobile and Apalachicola Rivers in West Florida.5 6

The

beneficence of Spain was subservient to her mercantilism.
Congressional committee concluded that Spain had the
following intentions:
To engross to itself the trade of its colonies,
and affords us every reason to apprehend that
Spain will not readily aQ~it us to pass through
her territory to carry on a trade either with
each.other or with foreign nations.57
54state Papers and Correspondence, p. 55
55ASPFR, p.

56state
57Ibid.,

527.

Papers and Correspondence, p. 86.
p. 860
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This Congressional committee confirmed the calamitous
V'

effects the closure had o·n western lands even if A..mericans
retained the right to navigate the Mississippi River.
An outlet to the sea was necessary to maintain trade with
foreign markets and the Atlantic States.

The committee,

despite the militaristic response of westerners and
Federalists, proposed an appropriation of $2,000,000 to
secure the right of deposit peaceably by purchasing New Orleans
and the Floridas.5

8

Congress

agreed~to

the appropriation.59

While Jeff'erson attempLed to forestall martial Federalists,,
the Spanish minister to the United States, Marques de Casa Yrujo,
was easily induced to denounce publicly the cessation of the
American right of deposit at New Orleans.

60

Tnis indicates

that the revocation was not a concerted action promoted by
Spanish

officials~

Apparently Intendant Morales was acting

alone, relying on the permission he had previously secured
from Charles IV and concealing his plans from everyone
including Spanish officials of higher-rank than he.

61

Events in Paris moved quickly during the first rour
months of 1803.

On January 3, 1803 Livingston learned of

S8state Papers and
59 Sprague, p. 293.
60
61

.

Ibid., p. 290.
Malone, p. 265.

Correspondence, p.

88.
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the closure of New Orleans.

62

Hhile Victor's expedition

remained icebound in Holland, Livingston pressed American
interests by pursuing negotiations with Talleyrand.

Their

diplon:atic re.lationship fail.ed to improve and Livingston
bla."!1ed the slow pace of the negotiations on Madison.

In a

letter written in mid-February the Anerican minister· asserted
that he could arrange a conference with Talleyrand anytiRe
but was only postponing the appointment until specific
instructions from Madison had been received.

63

Although they were not meeting, Livingston and Talleyrand
were corresponding with one another.
February

In his letter of

19, 1803, Talleyrand denied Livingston's charges that

French finances were in a state of

~rnbarrassment. 6 4

Livingston

continued to deal jointly with the issues of Louisiana and the
k~erican

claims and he estimated the total of those claims

at 20,000,000 livres or

$?,600,000.

Talleyrand's response

to the claims estimate was as follows:
It is entirely new to us that they /the claim~7
can be raised, ~y ~ny vg~uation ~hatever, to the
sum of twenty millions.
Talleyrand upbraided the

fu~erican

together the two disparate matters:

62

nangerfield, p.

63ASPFR,
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minister for linking
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Affairs so different iri their nature ought
to be kept as much as possible apart, and should
certainly not be united. It is entirely opposed
to the-.maxims of Government, adopted by the
republic, to mingle important and delicate political relations with calcul5~ions of account and
mere pecuniary interests.
Almost two weeks later the French Minister was still·
criticizing Livingston's· mingling of diplomacy and finance.
At the same time Livingston was informed of the appointment
of General Bernadotte as French Minister to Hashington D.
His instructions were to clarify the claims issue. 6 7

c.

Bernadotte's

appointment nullified Livingston's need to approach Talleyrand
on the subject or the American claims and even Louisiana since
it was, according to Talleyrand, "the fixed determination
of this Government to treaty only in Arnerica.n

66

ASPFR, p.

68

In Talleyrand's

546.

67Dangerfield, p. 349.
68 ASPFR, p. 545. Livingston initially interpreted
Bernadotte's mission as a threat to successful negotiations
in France.
On January 24, 1803, the ~~erican minister had
info-rmed Madison of the extent of Bernadette's powers: "He
will have full powers to settle everything." By February 18
Livingston had reevaluated the appointment. He wrote to
Madison: "And I believe you may look upon his present mission
as honorable banishment."
Monroe in his Autobiograph~ stated that Bernadette's
appointment was banistunent more than honor since Napoleon was
jealous of the General 1 s power. Military chiefs were Napoleon's
competitors. Therefore to rid himself of Bernadotte, Napoleon
had offered him the Government of Louisiana but the General
refused when certain of his requests were denied. Then the
First Consul proffered Bernadotte the mission to the United
States, granting him much ''power to adjust all the differences
with that rising Republic." Other inducements were added
making the assignment very attractive. Bernadotte accepted,
not realizing that the First Consul still intended to settle
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opinion news of Monroe's appointment further decreased
Livingston's need to negotiate with him.

What Livingston

could do in France was try to restore America's right of
deposit at New Orleans.

Talleyrand concluded:

If, upon the arrival of 1-'.lr. :Monroe, he can
suggest aµ9thing better, I shall heartily concur
with him. 0

The final rebuff.

Livingston's former efforts confronted

an impenetrable obstacle not just in Talleyrand and Bernadotte
but in Honroe's appointment.
On

Janua~y

13, 1803 the United States Senate approved

James Monroe's appointment as Minister Plenipotentiary and
Envoy Extraordinary to France.7°

His appointment allowed

French officials to put off negotiations with Livingston
until the new minister's arrival.

\·Jhile diplomatic activity

between French and American ministers was at a stalemate, the
French moved toward a resllr.1ption of war with England.

The

Peace ui' A.miens oe-cween them appeared shaky as Napoleon
publicly and ironically accused British Lord Whitworth of
the cession question in France. Bernadotte left Paris
before Monroe's arrival but with the delay in the sailing
of his fr~gate to America, he learned of the Treaty before
he left France. Indignant, General Bernadotte returned
to Paris. The Autobiography of James Monroe, ed. Stuart
Gerry Brown (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press,
1959), pp. 180-181.
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representing a

na~~on

intent on war and belligerently

responded tu the Britain's protestations with nI must either

have Malta or war!"7l
-~

In the midst of these

Europ~an

coming to the end of his solo

tensions Livingston was

diplo~acy.

He had followed a

tedious daily schedule, conducted creative negotiations through
extralegal channels and relentlessly pursued his_instructions
to confirm the cession and to deteriliine its extent.

However,

the memorial he had published in August 1802 had been too
aggressive and um·li sely alluded to a Franco-A..'11erican
solidarity when America's bargaining position depende9 partly
upon her threats o!' alliance with England.7 2

Livingston's

correspondence with Rufus King had violated common sense and
his proposals of a familial haven for the Bonapartes had
appeared absurd to the President and Secretary of State.
With their increasing doubts concerning Livingston's judgment
and with the obstacles confronting him standing as impediments
to fruitful negotiations, Madison and Jefferson turned more
to the French minister in the States, Pichon, who in turn
passed on their concernsand requests to ranking French officials

71 Henry Ada~s, History of the United States During the
Aclrninistrations of Jefferson and J:2dison, Vol. 1, Jefferson,
1

abridged (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey:

1963)' p. 60.

72 Peterson,

pp.

757-758.

Prentice-Hall,
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and the First Consul.

Instructions were less frequent

until Livingston wrote on February 18, 1803:
I am not satisfied, from examining my instructions,
and commission, that I am empowered to do anything
but the common routine of business.73
To restrict Livingston to a "common routine of business"
ii

were Jefferson's and Madison's intentions.
the United States, the 8ecretary of
had decided

tna~

~tate

The President of
and the 8enate

negotiations in France were to be continued

through the joint efforts of Robert R. Livingston and his new
associate,

James Monroe.

If Livingston were chagrined over

the limitations imposed upon him in his instructions, then
his reaction to Monroe's appointment could predictably
be disappointment, embarrassment and anger.

73ASPFR, p. 533.

CHAPTER VI
THE JOINT COMMISSION AND THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE
The Seventh Congress of the United States on January 11,

1803, received President Jefferson's Annual Message describing
America's concern with the cession of Louisiana to France
and the anger of the western territories over the suspension
of the right of deposit at New Orleans.

To aid in the nego-

tiations with France, Jefferson proposed the appointment of
an additional diplomat to join Livingston.

This new appointee

would carry with him the most recent sentiments of the public
and the opinions of American officials as secured "by full
communications of all the views we entertain on this interesting
subject.~

Therefore; Livingston and Charles Pinckney were

nominated to serve as ministers plenipotentiary and
James Monroe as minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary
in both France and Spain, since the Floridas remained
. h possessions.
.
1
S panis

on January 13, 180 3·.

The Senate confirmed the nominations
Following the Senate's confirmation,

Thomas Jefferson wrote to Monroe explaining the importance
of an informed negotiator in France and notifying him of his
appointment.
1

ASPFR, p.

475.
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Jefferson referred to the "agitation of the public
mind" generated by the closure of New Orleans.
had yet

caln~ed

No measure

the West and, realizing that the issue of

New Orleans and the Floridas had so many facets which
could only be imparted through "fu.11 and frequent oral
com..r::it.mications," the only alternative was to send a minister
extraordinary to join Livingston.

Selecting this perscn had

been a simple r:1atter, Jefferson confided.

T.ne President

·wrote:
Having determined on this, there could not be
two opinions amone; the republicans as to the
perso~.
You possessed the unlimited confidence
of t~e adFlinistration and of the western people;
and generally of the republicans everywhere; and
were you to refuse to go, no other man can be
fou...11d who does this. 2
In Jefferson's opinion, the country would experience
an immediate calm if l',.lonroe accepted; his refusal would lead
to universal

chag~in.

The destiny of the United States

rested with this mission and only Monroe possessed tnose
qualifications which enabled him to assume such a momentous
responsibility.

Jefferson assured Monroe:

But so~e men are born for the public. Natur~
by fitting them for the service of the human race
on a broad scale, ~as stamped them with the evidences
of her destination and their duty.3
2

Jefferson, p.

. 3Ibid., p. 344.

344 .
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To Jefferson

an~

Madison, Monroe's acceptance was

necessary since they were convinced it woul.d appease the
West, which considerea.-the navigation of the Mississippi River
and the right of deposit at New Orleans indispensable.4

I

To

Charles Pinckney, Madison described the importance of the
Mississippi River to Westerners:
It is the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac,
and all the navigable rivers or the Atlantic
States, formed into one stream. 5
The Westerners were commercially dependent upon the
:Mississippi River and they were willing to accept Monroe as
their spokesman in place of Livingston, whose aristocratic
interests appeared inimical to theirs.
the Westerners' problems.

6

Monroe understood

When he had served as a Congressman

from Virgina, he had sympathized with the economic needs of
\
the West, and supported the rights of the western population

/

4New Orleans had become the depository of an incr~asing
amount of commercial products transported down the Mississippi
River and its tributaries and shipped to the Atlantic States
and foreign countries. The right to deposit was indispensable
since such products were floated down from t~e Ohio and
Cumberland valleys in keel and flatboats and New Orleans was
the strategic location for unloading and storing these goods
before they were loaded onto ocean-going vessels.
Thomas P.
Abernethy, The South in the New Nation, 1789-~819, vol. 4 of
A History of the South, ed. Wendell Holmes Stephenson and E.
Merton Coulter, 10 vois.
(Louisiana:
Louisiana State University
Press, 1961), p. 254.

5ASPFR,

p. 527.

6 Sprague, p. 292.
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to·.navigate the Mississippi.7
the Jay-Gardoqui Treaty of

He had fervently opposed

1785,

which would have postponed

for twenty-five years the western navigation of the River.

8

While the Westerners appreciated his stance on domestic
issues, :Monroe's extensive political background qualified
him for the diplomatic appointment.

He had served as a

R6 presentative from Virginia in the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Congresses and had been elected Senator from Virginia in 1790.9
Serving as Senator for. t.hree· Congressional sessions, Monroe
held important committee assignments, introduced a contraversial bill which would have opened doors of the Senate
to the public, assumed the leadership 01· the Republican Party
in the Senate and promoted a policy of friendship

toward France.

Despite Monroe's critical comments of Federalists Alexander
Hamilton and John Jay, Washington

in

1794

offered Monroe

tne post--of. Minister-to- France--to-replace-Gouverneur-!Sorris-who had been recalled at the request of the French Government.
Since relations between France and the U.

s.

were disintegrating,

Washington thought it best to appoint a Republican to the
ministerial post in France.

10

In

1796 Monroe

was recalled

?Hermann, p. 27.

8 Sprague, p.
292.
9 Hermann, p.

JO.

Harry Ari1mon, James Monroe: ~he ~uest for National
Identity (New York: ·McGraw-Hill, 1971), pp. 83-112.
10
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from France due to his opposition to Jay's Treaty and his
attempts to weld France to the United States when Washington
had decided to intently pursue amiable relations with
England.

11

Monroe returned to the States and in 1799 the

citizens of Virginia elected him Governor. 12

When l·:onroe rs

gubernatorial term was ending early in 1803, he was planning
a journey West to
.
,nis
.
1 aw
resuming

inspec~
.L •

prac~ice.

his Kentucky landholdings before

13

When Jefferson requested his services as a minister
in January 180~.Monroe's reaction was mixed.

France had

changed much since he was there in the l 790's.

The French

Directory &nd her Councils had been supplanted by a Consular
government; democracy was no longer popular. 1 4

There was

also the possibility that this second diplomatic venture
might end in failure, threatening political suicide at home.
In addition to the changes in the French government and the
possibility of failure, Monroe's finances would be taxed.
He had been forced into debt as a result of his last diplomatic
lr
effort and had not yet fully recovered from that debt. ~
11
Miller, p. 194·
i ·-

~Hermann, p. 30.

13 Malone, p. 269.
1
4Autobiography of James Monroe, pp.
l5Malone, p. 270.

155-156.

87
Jefferson, aware of Monroe's financial concerns but sensitive
to public criticism, explained in his letter of January

1803

13,

to Monroe that the Republicans' cut in government spending

had decreased the amount formerly given to ministers extraordinary in previous administrations.

Jefferson advocated

that economy be Monroe's watchword:
Mr. Madison's friendship and mine to you being
so well known, the public will have eagle eyes to
watch if we grant you any indulgences out of the
general rule; ••• 10
Despite the apprehension of failure and financial
strain, Konroe accepted

the ministerial post.

In an early

March letter from New York, the newly-appointed diplomat
revealed to Jefferson his determination to succeed at the
negotiations in order to avoid public disappointment and
disapprova1;1- 7 Re-·would "certainly. labour to obtain the best
terms- possible. nlS - Monroe's- -response to Jefferson's - ·
request was:
I accept my appointment with gratitude and enter
on its duties with an ardent zeal to accomplish its
objectG. I derive much satisfaction from a knowledge
that I am in the hands of ttose whose views are sound,
are attached to justice, and will view my conduct
with candor and liberality, under these circumstances
I embark with con!"idence & am fearless oi the
result as it respects myself personally. 9

While publicly Jefferson explained that Monroe's

16

'

Jefferson, pp.

17Monroe, p. ?.
18
19

Ibid.,.p. 7.
rbid., p. 7.
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appointment was meant to calm the anxieties of the West, his
other reason for engaging Monroe, although disclaimed by him
in his Annual Address to Congress, was his loss of confidence
in Livingston~s

judgment.

Livingston's memorial of August 1802,

with its allusions to Franco-American solidarity, had brought
protests from London which Washington D. C. sought to amend
quickly.

His offers to· Joseph Bonaparte were bizarre and

hinted of hri.bery.

Even the suggestion that the

u.

S. secure

land west or the Mississippi River and above the mouth of
the Arkansas River was unappealing to Jefferson, who did not
want any territory of the

u.

S. to serve as a buffer between

British Canada and French Louisiana.

20

In contrast to Livingston, Monroe's acumen could be
implicitly relied upon and his presence in the U.

s.

allowed him to be thoroughly instructed before departure.
Writing to Dupont de Nemours on February 1, 1803, Jefferson
emphasized the importance. of Monroe's briefing:
Multiplied conversations with him, and views of
the subject taken in all the shapes in which it
can present itself, have possessed him with our
estimates of everything relating to it, with a
minuteness which no written communication to
Mr. Livingston could ever have attainea.21
20
21

Peterson, pp. 757-758.
Jefferson, pp. 347-348.
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Armed with the latest instructions, Monroe would
journey to France to preserve peace.

Jefferson and Madison

were confident of Monroe's ability to arrive at a settlement
suitable to the Frenchmd calming to the western population.
The President and the Secretary of State did not view this
as an opportune moment to expand the borders of the United
States.

Expansion was secondary to the resolution of the

immediate problem of the closure of New Orleans and the
assurance that a violation of American privileges would not
recur.

/

Monroe sailed from New York in early March.
not known in Washington until April 19

It was

that on March 1, 1803

the Foreign Secretary of Spain had signed a formal order
restoring thE? right gf deposi_t in New Orleans •..... Spanish. __ _
Minister Yrujo had encouraged his country to suspend the
revocation,-pointing out· that-American leaders would be
compelled to declare war due to the pressure placed upon
them by the Federalists, the public and even Republicans.
Also, Spain, realizing that a resumption of the European war
was likely, thought it best to be free of the problems resulting
from the closure of New Orleans. 22
Monroe arrived in Paris on April 12, 1803 and with him
came new instructions under wnich both ministers were to
negotiate.23
221'-i:alone, p. 281

23ASPFR, p. 529.
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The ministers were to try· to purchase New Orlean·s.
If the French were unwilling to sell the island, then they
were to secure jurisdiction-·over some other space large enough
for a booming

com..~ercial

town or acquire privileges of holding

real estate for cor.1mercial purposes, of providing hospitals
and of having consuls or other officials in New Orleans.
absolute

minimQ~

The

was the attairunent of sovereignty over a

place of deposit. 2 4

Tne Floridas were also important.

From his personal

study of the geography of the Gulf Coast, Thomas Jefferson
acknowledged the strategic importance of West Florida.
Florida was more valuable to the

u.

West

S. than East Florida

although together Kadison appraised their value at only one
quarter that of the island_- of New

Dr.leans.~?. ___ Monroe .. and ___ -

Livingston were therefore authorized to purchase New Orleans
and -the ·Floridas··:for any amount· up to

$10,000,000~

-- If tnis

offer were rejected, they were to negotiate for the most
economical settlement which would insure the rights of
26
.
~·
nav1ga01on
an d d eposi"t •

Throughout the negotiations "Monroe and Livingston were
to assure French officials that American nsensibility and
2

2

4~alone,

p. 286.

5Ibid., p.

26

287.
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unanimity"

demanded that relations with France be precarious
becfu~e

the legal boundary between

2
Louisiana and the United States. 7

Therefore, their instruc-

until the Mississippi River

tions pertained to lands east of the Mississippi.

The only

hint that Americans were interested in lands west of the
River had come from Livingston in his previous negotiations
with Joseph Bonaparte.

b~ffer

His enthusiasm for an American

state in the western lands was not shared by Jefferson or

.
28
Ma d ison.
Together Monroe and Livingston were to acquire New Orleans
and the Floridas.

If both Floridas could not be secured, then

West Florida was preferable to East.

Conditions favoring their

efforts were the instability of the European peace, the possible
Anglo-lunerican alliance and the depressed state of French
finances. 2 9

These circumstances did not insure diplomatic

success, since one major factor working against their joint commission was Livingstons unfavorable response to
ln a

Monroe~

app:rl.ntm:nt.

letter dated January 18, 1803 Madison assured

Livingston that Monroe's appointment should not be misconstrued,
as a lack of conridence in his diplomatic abilities.

Despite

this the American minister ~esented Monroe's nomination.JO

27~SPFR, p. 540.
~

.

c Malone, p. 288.
2

9ASPFR, p.
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To allay Livingston's iridignati.on and to reenforce I•iadison' s
assurances, Jefferson dispatched.a letter to the American
minister in early February.

Jefferson emphasized the wisdom

of Monroe's appointment since it quelled the inflammatory
attempts of the Federalists and Westerners.

Tne President

also explained that Monroe's presence in the

u. s.

had allowed

for an indispensable and thorough briefing which included
all ideas and proposals acceptable to the President and Secretary!
of State.3 1

Such a complete briefing would have been quit~

difficult, if not impossible, by dispatches between France

u. s.

and the

The fu.ture destinies of our country hang on the
event of this negotiation and I am sure that
they could not be placed in more able or more
zealous hands. On our parts we shall be satisfied
that what you do not effect, car111ot be effected.
Accept-therefore assurances· of· my sincere· and
constant affection and high respect.32
Livingston_remaine.d nettled by

th~

appointment despite the

assurances of ''sincere and constant affection and high respect."
Nevertheless, upon hearing the news -i-n March, Livingston sent
word to Madison that he would do everything to pave the way for
Monroe, whose mission he hoped would be successful.

At the

same time Livingston informed Madison that Monroe's appointment had not facilitated negotiations but actually
impeded them.
1

For one thing, Livingston no longer could

3 Jefferson, pp. 353-354.
32 Ibid., pp. 354.
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rely on Joseph Bonaparte's

assi~tance.33

Livingston complained:

It will, however, cut off one resou1·ce on

which I greatly relied; because I had established
a confidence which it will take Mr. Monroe some
time to inspire.J4
Livingston's complaint was fabricated since he had
just learned of Monroe's appointment and.Joseph Bonaparte
had terminated his role as an intermediary between the American
minister and the First Consul on January

7,

1803--six days

before Congress approved Monroe's nomination! Also impeding
negotiations were Pichon's dispatches, which assured the
French that Monroe's appointment had tranquilized the West,
had hindered negotiations; the French were now willing to
wait for Monroe.

Not only had negotiations been postponed

but seriously undercut since a possible western uprising had
been a strong force .. motivating the French to consider cessions
east and west of the Kississippi River.
cha~~as

Livingston concluded, the

Without that threat,

of bringing the French

to terms were reduced.35
Livingston's frustration with the arrested negotiations
was compounded by his certainty that prior to the announcement
or Monroe's ,,appointment a settlement was about to be negotiated
~ith

the French.

On March

24,

1803 Livingston informed

33ASPFR, p. 537.
341
·L3~
~., p. _,) v.
35Dangerfield, pp.

356-357.
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Madison that a French answer to American requests was ready
but had been delayed by the calming news in Pichon's letter.
Livingston explained:
Re /"Talleyrand.7 told me that an answer was
prepared, and that everything should be arranged;
and I have no doubt the answer contained all
those assuragces which I have been so long
soliciting.J
.

\'1hen Talleyrand suggested that certain matters be
postponed until Monroe!s arrival, Livingston objected:
The United States, sir, have vested me with
full powers to receive and make those arrangements; and, in the appointment of Mr. Monroe,
lointly with me, as minister extraordinary to
the First Consul, it was by no means their
intention, considering the variety of accidents
whivh may postpone or prevent his arrival, to
defer receiving from the Government of France
those explicit confirmations of the treaty of
Madrid which must precede every arrangement
which·it might be thought proper-hereafter to- enter
enter into.37
Not only was nivingston concerned with the setback in
negotiations but he was anxious lest Americans might i11cor-·
'-

rectly interpret-Monroe's appointment as evidence of Livingston's
neglect of their interests.3 8

To remove those suspicions,

the American minister suggested the following to Madison:
3bASPFR, p.

549.

37~., pp. 550-551.
3Sibid., pp.

548.
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I trust that a communication of my notes to
some of them !American citizens? would show that
I had gone as-far as it was possible for me to
go, and Derhaps further than my instructions would
justify.39
Although aware that new instructions were coming and
despite his assurances to Madison that he would help pave t~e
way fo~ Monroe, Livingston continued to press French officials
in the hopes that he could negotiate a settlement prior to
On April 8, 1803 Livingston received a

Monroe's arrival.

copy of the New York Chronicle which contained the entire
text of Senator Ross's Resolution • 40

Livingston, unaware

that the Spanish had restored the right of deposit at New
Orleans, quickly sent the account to Talleyrand to prove that
:Monroe's appointment had not completely appeased the West.4 1
On April 10 Napoleon issued a surprise statement to his

v

Minister of Finance, Barb~Marbois, and his Minister of Marine,
Denis Decres, which dramatically altered Franco-American
negotiations.

Fearing that English forces would immediately

seize Louisiana if war between France and Britain broke out,
N~poleon was considering the cession of all of Louisiana to

the United States.4 2

39 ASPFR, p.

548.

4°The Ross Resolution authorized the President to take
New Orleans by force. They were introduced in the Unil..es States
Senate in February 1803 but were narrowly defeated. Peterson,
p. 758.

41 Dangerfield,
42 Ibid.,

p.

p.

359.

358.
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Marbois in his Histoire de la Louisiane recalled Napoleon's
reasoning:
They ask of me only one town in Louisiana;
but I already consider the colony as entirely
lost; and it appears to me that in the hands
of this growing power it will be more useful
to the policy and even to the commerce of
France than if I should attempt to keep it.43
On April 11, 1803 Marbois was summoned by the First
Consul and informed that Louisiana would definitely be ceded
to the U.

s.

Napoleon then instructed Marbois:

I direct you to negotiate this ari-air. Do
not even wait for the arrival of Mr. Monroe:
have an interview this very day with Mr. Livingston.44
Prior to Marbois's meeting with Livingston, the

v

American minister received from Talleyrand an invitation
to call at his quarters on the evening of April 11.

Upon

Livingston-ts· arri val,--the French Mini·ster asked if· the
United States_ would be interestej.in purchasing all of
Louisiana.45

Livingston informed Talleyrand that the

u. s.

did not want all of Louisiana but only New Orleans, the
Floridas and perhaps a stretch of land west of the Mississippi
above the Arkansas R1ver.

Talleyrand ·pointed out that

wit:nout New Orleans, the rest of the territory was almost
worthless to France.

When pressed to state a

43nangerfield, p. 359.

44~.,

p. 359.

45nangerfield, p. 359.

purch~se

price,
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Livingston proposed $20,000,000.

The French Minister considered

this bid too low and encouraged Livingston to reflect on a
higher offer before meeting with Marbois on the next day.4 6
On April 12 :Monroe arrived in

Paris~

His hopes to

become immediately involved in the negotiations were blocked
by Livingston's efforts to exclude him.

Talleyrand's offer

reenforced Livingston's thinking that France was quite willing
to negotiate.

Livingston believed his perseverance and creative

diplomacy had paved the way for a settlement with the French
and did not want to share that success with Monroe.
Livingston, despite Talleyrand's offer and his own
optimism, in a letter dated April 12th to Monroe insisted that
the prospects of the mission were discouraging.

The only

recourse was war •.. Livingston .asserted, -"War ••• might do
something for us; nothing else would.n47
rnat evening Monroe met with Livingston, who immediately
inquired about the fate of the Ross Resolution.

\~1en

Monroe

informed him of their defeat, Livingston expressed his regret:
With a remark that force only could give us New
Orleans and that nothing but the actual possession
of thecountry could give sucgess to the mission in
which they were associated.4
At this time Livingston was unaware of Napoleon's
sudden statement on April 10 and possibly. believed that his
presentation

46ASPFR,

of the Ross Resolution
p.

to Talleyrand on April 8

552.

47Autobiography of James Monroe, p.
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.. d
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had resulted in the French Minister's offer of the 11th to
sell all of Louisiana.

With the defeat of the Resolution,

France, no longer fearing a military advance on New Orleans
might withdraw her offer.
Filled with these apprehensions, Livingston
April 12 appointment with Marbois.

kept his

Not wishing to include

Monroe in his negotiations with the Minister of France,
Livingston advised Monroe that it would be necessary for
the new minister to be formally presented to Marbois before
entering into any discussions with him.

Monroe did not

accompany Livingston.49
At this meeting between Marbois and Livingston, the
Minister of Finance informed the American of Napoleon's
decision of April 10th and his disposition to sell Louisiana.
Marbois suggested $22,SOO,OOO for the purchase price.

Livingston

refused this as exorbitant, explaining that the pa)'"'Tnent of
ruch a sl1Il1 woulu throw the Jefferson administration into disfavor and lead to an ele.ction which replaced Republicans with

J

those inimical to France.

Marbois observed that the

opportunity to purchase such an expansive territory was rare
and.noted that Americans would enjoy the exclusive navigation
of the Mississippi and the absence of foreign neighbors.
To insure,the acquisition of the Floridas, Livingston asked
Marbois if France would agree not to possess the Floridas,
49Dangerfield, p.

364.
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/
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would help the U.

s.

to procure them, and relinquish all

the rights France might have to them.

Marbois agreed.

In

response to another request made by Livingston, Marbois
consented to exert his influence and have the negotiations
transferred from the Minister of .fi'oreign Affairs to himself.
With all these points agree:!. upon Livingston then decided
to consult Monroe later about Marbois's asking price.SO
Livingston hurriedly wrote to Madison to inform him
that the negotiations had opened even before Mr. Monroe had
been

pr~sented.5l

Livingston continued:

'l'he field open to us is infinitely larger
than our instructions contemplated, the revenue
increasing, and the land more than adequate
to sink the capital, should we even go the
sum proposed by I-~arboi s •••• ~'le shall do all
we .can.to cheapen the purchase; but my
present sentiment is that we shall buy. 52
Livingston wanted to be given the credit for what he

/
believed was the culmination of his efforts and designs.

By

discouraging Monroe's attendance at the discussion between
Marboi~

and himself on the pretext that Monroe had not been

formally presented, Livingston hoped to exclude the new
minister from playing any part in reaching a settlement.
George Dangerfield concurs:
And surely it was only a plausible pretext, a
point of etiquette (that Marbois could not treat
50 ASPFR, p. 554.·
5lDangerfield, p.
,-J2

::> Adams,

p. 63.

365.
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with Monroe until he had been formally
presented) too strictly urged, that had
kept Monroe away from the conference
at the Treasury where the price for
Louisiana had first been discussed.53
Problems between the

coi~eagues

f~

had not been

reso~ved

by April. 15.th when Monroe wro-ce iviadison:
I was inrormed on my arrival. here by
Mr. Skipwith that Mr. Livingston mortified
at my appointment had done everything in his
power to turn the occurences in .A.'11erica, and
even my mission to his account, by pressing
the Government on every point with a view
to show that he had accomplished what was
wished without my aid: and perhaps also
that my mission had put in hazard what mig!1t
otherwise have been easily obtained. His
official correspondence will show what occurred prior to my arrival & sufficiently proves
th2t he did not abstain even on hearing that I
was on my way, from the topics intrusted to
us jointly ••••
You will perceive the dilerrnna into which I
have been & am still placed by this course of
proceeding, since I have not only to negotiate
with the French Government, espeCi~~ly its
ministers, but my colleagues also.~4

On April

14

Monroe's presentation to Marbois took place

and he acquiraithe status of a recognized person.55

Supposedly

Monroe and Livingston were to cooperate and through their
joint diplomacy secure an agreement favorable to American
interests.

Although Livingston finally agreed to consult

53Dangerfield, p. 365.
54Monroe, pp. 9-10.
55Ammon, p. 210.
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Monroe about Marbois's proposed purchase price, his priae
compelled him to complain to Madison that Monroe and he
were of unequal ran.le.

Writing to the Secretary of State on

April 17, Livingston, protesting his inferior rank and,
believing his age and station entitled him not to have
anyone placed above him, asserted:

"It is important that

I should be thought to stand as well with our Goverr...rnent
'\

as any other person."5 6

v'

The friction between Livingston and Monroe did not
prevent negotiations from moving at a rapid pace.
together they responded to
~0uisiana.

Marbois~s

Working

asking price .for

Instead of the $22,550,000 or 60,000,000 livres

~~rbois had suggested,

the American diplomats offered

40,000,000 which included P;nerican claims totaling 20,000,000

livres.

T'neir proposal was met with protestations of great

sorrow by Marbois, who claimed the sum was. insufficient
and raised fears that the whole business might be defeated.57
On April 16th Livingston called on Marbois again and
was inf'ormed that the First Consul had received the American
ministers' proposition coldly.

Napoleon maintained that

American claims totaled only 3,000,000 livres, in contrast to
Livingston's persistent claim. of 20,000,000.

5b~SPFR,

p. 554.

57Ibid., p. 554.

1'1arbois
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encouraged Livingston to press Talleyrand to make an·appointment for him to consult with the First Consul and renew
the subject, since Marbois feared that negotiating powers
were no longer in his hands.

Livingston concluded, nThus we

stand at present, resolving to rest a .few days upon our oars."5 8
Livingston continued to press the debt, all the while
complaining to Madison of the insuf.ficiency o.f the instructions
carried to France by Monroe.

These instructions gave the

commission power to treat for lands only on theeast side of
the.Mississippi River, whil~ Livingston wanted to include
the west side as he had previously done in his attempts to
obtain land above the Arkansas River.59
From hpril
J

worked alone.

17 to the 27 Monroe was ill and Livingston

During this time pro~osals were exchanged with

Marbois and with each note their positions drew closer
together.

By April

24

Napoleon gave Marbois the powers of

minister plenipotentiary to treat with the American ministers.
On April

27 Marbois carried a projet drawn up by Talleyrand

to a meeting at Monroe's lodging where only Monroe, Livingston
and Marbois were present.
following stipulations:

Talleyrand's projet contained the
the French Republic was to cede its

rights over Louisiana; .following the cession the territories
and "prope,r dependencies" o.f Louisiana were to become a part
of the American Union; the U.
5SASPFR, p.

554.

59 Ibid.,

554.

p.

s.

was to favor French commerce

103
'in Louisiana.by granting it the same rights American

J
commerce enjoyed with perpetual entrepots established at
six points on the Mississippi River and by giving France
a perpetual right to navigate t.he River; the U. S. was to
assume all debts due

~~erican

citizens in accordance with the

terms of the Treaty of Morfontaine; and the U. S. was to
.
60
pay $20,000,000 to France.
Marbois considered these terms too harsh and proposed
another set which he believed acceptable to the First Consul.
He suggested $20,000,000 for the purchase price, which
included $4,000,000 in claims (Livingston had appraised them
at $7,500,000) as part of the actual cost thereby reducing
the net outlay to $16,ooo,ooo.

Livingston was dissatisfied

since he believed the claims should be treated in an
"especial manner."

Despite the First Consul's promises that

the claims would.ha paid and Marbois's assurances· that a
provision concerning them would be included in the treaty,
j

Livingston continued to press the debt issue.

I

the consequences of Livingston's persistence and convinced

I

Monroe, fearing

l

I
I

that if all three of the ministers "were all of the same
opinion respecting the debts that the ground on which they
stood could not be impaired by the failure of this negotiation,*'
suggested discussing other subjects.

60

61

Adams, p. 66
Monroe, pp. 12-13.
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Following this ministerial gathering Livingston

I
and Monroe drew up a compromise projet.

On April 29 "'

the American ministers went to the Treasury.

They propose=d

paying $10,000,000 for Louisiana allowing $4,000,000 for
American claims.

Only after Monroe and Livingston agreed

to raise the offer to $11,250,000 for Louisiana and

$3,750,000

for the liquidation of American claims did Harbois accept.
The American ministers' proposal was le-rt with Marbois
with the

l'Y'

de rs tanding that it would be shown to Napoleon

on April 30.

62

On May 1 Monroe was presented to the First Consul and
dined wi ti1 him.

According to Monroe's Journal of Memoranda,

6

no mention was made of Louisiana. 3

At 8:30 p.m. that same

day, Livingston and Monroe went to Marbois's house to discuss the treaty.

Marbois had no objections to the insertion

of the Third Article from the Treaty of_San Idlefonso,_ which
Livingston interpreted as including West Florida.
62

nangerfiel~,

64

p. 367.

63
-- Monroe, pp. 15-16.

64nangerfield, p. 368.

This Article referred to the
extent of the Province of Louisiana in an imprecise way:
" ••• The Colony-or Province of Louisiana, with the same extent
it now has in the hands of Spain, and that it had when France
possessed it; and such as it should be arter the treaties
subsequently entered into between Spain and other states.~
Talleyrand believed this Article assured France West Florida
and the Mobile Bay region since Iberville appropriated them to
Louisiana in 1699! Livingston and Monroe were gratif"ied with
Harbois's willingness to include this Article in tne Louisiana
Treaty. It was the only provision regarding Louisiana's
boundaries and Livingston believed it guaranteed the transrer
of West Florida to the u. s. Ammon, p. 213.
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j

for commercial privileges, .Marbois maintained that

As

all France really sought was an exemption of French productions,
manufactures and tonnage from duties not charged Americans
and the right to transport these goods into the ports
along the Mississippi River.

Regarding A~erican Bonds, which

the French were willing to accept in pa·yment, Ma.rbois requested
that the period during wnich these Bonds were to be irredeemable
be eliminated.

Monroe and Livingston objected to that proposal

with the arglli~ent that some check on the ~iquidation of the
debt was necessary.

~ne Americans approved an agreement pro-

viding for the issuance of Bonds at

6%

interest, which the

French could sell on tne open market in order to secure the
im~ediate cash desired by Napoleon.

~arbois finally admitted

that he recognized the propriety of the checx and would take
the treaty one last time to receive the First Consul's final

6r

approv"B.l. ·

::J

On May 2, 1803 the basic treaty was signed.
convention was added on May 9.

The claims

With the signing of the treaty,

Monroe prepared to leave for Spain but Consul Cambaceres
advised waiting and sneaking to Marbois first.

Marbois was

not at home when Monroe called and the American minister
decided to pay a visit to the Spanish a~bassador in France,
Marquis D'~zara, to discuss with him the subject of the
65r·1onroe, p. 17 •
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American's journey to Spain to treat for the Floridas.
D'Azara said that he hoped
resolved.

the matter could

qui~Kly

be

To facilitate the resolution, he had written

to the Spanish court two days ago, at the request of
Livingston, to inquire whether Spain

~ould

cede the Florida

to the U.S. and to ask authorization for him to treat in
France for them.

66

Monroe was surprised to learn of this development, since
Livingston had never spoken to him about approaching the
Spanish Ambassador and had actually pressed Monroe to travel
to Spain. 6 7
It would appear that Livingston was attempting to have
the negotiations brought to France while Honroe was en route
to· Spain.

When Monroe revealed his conversation with the

Spanish Ambassador and informed Livingston that his trip to
Spain was useless until D 1 Azara received a response, Livingston
defended the conversation as being a casual event in
which D 1 Azara misunderstood some suggestions the .American had
made.

68

Monroe recorded his response:

I told him that after the arrangement made by our
government wit~ respect to Spain, the affair ought
to have its course in the train in which it was
placed by it:
that I could not see any benefit to
be derived from an application of the Ambassador
to Spain to his court in the manner stated by
Hr. Livingston,·especially if I was to go there. 69

66Monroe, pp. 17-18.
6
7Ibid., pp. 17-18.
68
Ibid., p. 18.
ts7rbid., p. 19.
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The friction between the two American ministers had
not vanished.

Livingston wanted his pride preserved while

Honroe sought t~ enhance his political prestige.

Apparently

the credit for acquiring the Louisiana Purchase could not be
shared.
The terms of the treaty were generous and unbelievabie
considering the former unwillingness of French officials to
negotiate or.even to admit to their possession of Louisiana.
Excluding the land west of the Rockies and east of the
Mississippi River, 571,873,920 acres were sold to the United
States.

Tne Purcha:€e includ.al the pre sent states of Arkansas,

Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, North and South Dakota, parts of
Minnesota, Kansas, Colorado, Montana, Wyoming, Louisiana, all
of the Indian Territory and part of the Oklahoma Territory.
Tur $15,000,000 the U.S. acquired land wnose real and personal
property value escalated to $3,190,456,461 by 1890.7°
The purchase amount was payable in

6%

U.S. Government

Bonds redeemable at a rate of $3,000,000 per year beginning
in 1818.7

1

Napoleon, however, wanted immediate cash and

since no·French Bank agreed to float such a large bond issue
in Europe, the French Government, at the suggestion of the
Ame·rican ministers, opened negotiations to sell the bonds
in Holland and England through Hope & Company of

Amsterda~

70TTnerrnann, p. 36 •

71 samuel

Flagg Bemis, A Short ~istor~
Policy and Diplomacy (New York: Holt, 19 9
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particularly of the third article, the
French Republic has an incontestible title to
the domain and to 'the possession of the said
Territory: The First Consul of the French
Republic desiring to give to the United States
a strong proof of his friendship, doth hereby
cede to the said United States, in the name
of the French Republic, forever and in full
sovereignty, the said territory, witn all its
rights and appurtenances, as fully and in the
same manner as they have been acquired by the
French Republic, in virtue of the above-mentioned
treaty, concluded with His Catholic Majesty.74
The Second Article included in the cession the adjacent
islands belonging to Louisiana--"all public lots and squares
vacant lands, and all public buildings, fortifications,
barracks, and other edifices, which are not private property."
The Third Article required the incorporation of the inhabitants
of the ceded territory into the American governmental
system as soon as possible.

The Fourth established provisions

for th<:3 transfe1· of the territory to the U. S. and the Fifth
--·-transferred all military posts to American troops.
i

Article

Seven formulated arrangements for Spanish and French ships

!

sailing directly from these countries· or their colonies and

I

carrying only Spanish or French produce and manufactures to

j

I
I
I·

I
j

be admitted into the port of New Orleans and all otner legal
ports of entry within Louisiana for the next twelve years
and to enjoy the same importation privileges granted to
citizens •. Article Eight stipulated that when the twelve
74Hermann, p. 32.

u. s.

/·'
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years had expired, French ships would be granted the status
given to the "most favored nations in the ports above
mentioned.75
As for the claims convention, Livingston had taken
Marbois's Erojet and attempted to formulate a compromise.
When Monroe had read Livingston's proposal, he wrote his
colleague on May

5,

1803:

I have examined with great attention the
articles of the project which we presented
as agreed & a~ended between ourselves, to
Mr. Marbois & that which he returned to us,
& find that neither is drawn with sufficient
accuracy
ac~omplish the object which is
intended.7

tg

Monroe criticized several features of Livingston's
proposal, including the absolute submission to the French
bureau's deGisioi:is. in cases-where·-the cl-aims··-of- American· ..
citizens had been rejected.

Monroe rewrote the proposal

which was signed by French officials and the American
ministers on May
Ne~s

9J 7

of the Treaty caused some consternation in England.

Rufus King allayed English fears on May 15, 1803 when he
assured Lord

Hawkes~ury

that British right to navigate the

Mississippi had not been violatea.7 8. With Anglo-American

75 ASPFR,

pp. 506-507.

76 '
Monroe, p. 19.
77 Ibid., p. 20.

78 King, vol.

4,

pp. 262-263.
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relations suffering.some strain from impressment and

I

confiscation of goods, King prudently added the following
thought in his note to Lord Hawkesbury:
I flatter myself that this communication
willl be received with satisfaction, and
regarded as a new proof of the disposition
of the United States to observe towards
His :Majesty a spirit 01" a.mi ty and confidence,
important at all times, and mure especially, so
in present circumstances, to the harmony and
mutual prosperity of the two countries.f9
On his return to the United States, Rufus King carried
with him a letter from Livingston and Monroe which revealed
the terms of the treaty.
dispatched the letter to

Upon arriving in
Madison~

King

New~York,

On July ), 1803 Jefferson

learned of the treaty and immediately released the news to
the National Intelligencer who published it. on July
ij

4. 80

The Louisiana Purchase was the result of Napoleon's
announcement of April 10 which altered French foreign policy
by discarding her dreams of a western empire and extended

the borders of the United States hundreds of miles west of
the Mississippi River.

During 1801 and 1802 France had

sacrificed lives and money to secure Santo Domingo from
which Louisiana was to be invaded but only succeeded in
selling the land, that was to be her new empire, to a

79·King, vol.

4,

pp. 262-263.

8oMalone, pp. 284-296.
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comparatively unimpressive nation.

TJJis reversal of French

plans and her generous settlement with.the U. S. caused
Frenchmen and

Ai.~ericans

to attempt to discern what factors

or persons convinced Napoleon, the author 01· the French
foreign policy, to cede Louisiana.
In his Histoire de la Louisiane Marbois asserted that
prelimina.ry discussions were scarcely urnierway and the cession
of Louisiana was unanticipated when Monroe reached Le Havre
in early April. 81 This account strengthens the argument
that the French, unsure whether Monroe

ca~e

.

:..1e e.ri ng an

~

"olive branch or- a sword" waited to learn his intentions
before committing themselves to Livingston.
In July, after the treaty had

beco~e

public knowledge,

Thomas Jefferson responded to a congratulatory note from
General G-ates.

Publicly impartial, Jefferson wrote:

I find our opposition is very willing to
pluck feathers from Monroe, although not fond
of sticking them into Livingston's coat.
The truth is, both have a just portion of
merit; and were it necessary or proper~ it
would be shown that each has rendered
peculiar services, and of important value. 82

Jefferson acknowledged the merits or both men but
Madison criticized Livingston's methods in a letter to Monree.
BlDangerfield, p. 357.

82-.

Jefferson, p. 402.
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Madison concluded:
It is highly probable that if the appeal
to the French Governrrient had been less
hackneyed by the ordinary minister, a~d
been made under the solemnity of a joint
and extraordinary embassy, the impression
would have been greater and the gain better. 83
Livingston tried persistently to elevate his role in
the successful negotiations.

As late as Kay 12, 1803

Livingston was still reporting to Madison that productive
negotiations had begun before Monroe's arrival.

Livingston

claimed that the Louisiana Purchase was the result of the
following:

his attempt to obstruct French negotiations

for the Floridas by emphasizing their lack of
New Orleans were
of the

A~erican

val~e

if

not also French; his pressing the payment
claims; his dispatching the Ross

Resol~tion

to Talleyrand; and his frequent threat to the French of an

Anglo-~~erican alliance. 84
j

Livingston did not just allude to the points of argument
he had pressed upon the French, but he attempted to rewrite
In a letter to Madison dated April 13, 1803

j

history.

I

Livingston wrote that Napoleon's decision to sell Louisiana

I

I

came on the 10th of April.

II

occurred to him that people might try to formulate a relationship

I

I
l
j

After sending the letter it

3Letters and other wri tin~s of James J·~adison (New York:
R. Worthington, 1884), vol. 2, p. 184.
(Hereafter referred

8

to as I'iadison.)

84 ASPFR,

pp.

557-558.
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between Monroe's arrival at Le Havre on the eth and Bonparte's
decision on the 10th.

Livingston, failing to consider how

the French interpreted Monroe's mission, thought this
connection could be avoided if Bonaparte made his decision
on the morning of April 8 some hours before Monroe's arrival.
Therefore, Livingston substituted April 8 for the 10th in a

i

subsequent letter to Madison and in all of his letters to

1

l
I
I

the United States.

In time Livingston's correspondence

reached his American friends, all of whom believed that

I
l

Napoleon had decided to cede Louisiana an April 8, 1803 and
Talleyrand had made his offer on the 9th, not the 11th.
Besides that one letter to Madison dated April

13~

the only

otner primary source listing the correct dates was Marbois's
Histoire and if not-~or that;~ perhaps· Livingston's 'boup des
dates" could have succeeded.

85

To promote the idea of his indispensability, Livingston
had printed in the Boston, Washington, Philadelphia and New York

i

newspapers the memorial he had given to French officials in

I

I

I
i
I

August 1802.

At times the publication was accompanied by a

.laudatory cover letter from some American in Paris.

86

The

I

content of the memorial caused some Federalists to support

I

Livingston

l

when formerly they had called him a "rank Jacobin."

They credited him with being primarily responsible for the
8

5nangerfield, pp.

86 Ibid.,

p

]79.

377-378.
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cession since he had acted "without -authority f'rom his
government."

1rfuile the Federalists praised Livingston,

8

Madison ascribed the publication to a lack of discretion. 7
To Monroe, Madison wrote on July 30, 1803:
The publication of the: memorial is so improper,
and in reference to the writer invites such stric~
tures, that from him is not to be preslli~ed. The
passages against England have not escaped the lash.
It would not be very wonderful if they were to be
noticed forrnalSB or informally by the British
Legation here.
Madison's letter to Livingston condemning the publication
sparked an unrepentant reply.

Livingston did apologize but

only because a poor translation had appeared in the newspapers.
He also acknowledged that the nzeal of our friends" forced
them to make some extreme statements but these were made only
to do him justice. 8 9
Livingston labored to impress upon American officials
and the public his vital role in the Louisiana Purchase.
His pride compelled him to continue negotiations after learning
o.f Monroe's appointment and tue new instructions, to stress
unceasingly to Madison his successes and to attempt to
rewrite history.

George Dangerfield decided:

But Livingston was an eclectic: he devoted
his life to what he called the culture of
laurels.90
87 .

Malone, p. 299.

B$Madison, p. 184.

S9Dangerfield, P• 379.
90ibid -~, p. 299 •
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In contrast to Livingston, Monroe was self-effacing
in his appraisal of the successful negotiations as he ascribed
the success to the "wise and firm though moderate measures

.

of the Executive and Congress."

91

He decided:

The decision to offer us the territory by sale
was not the effect of any management of mine, for
it took place before I reached Paris; nor of m~
colleague or it would have taken place sooner.~2
Therefore, the success was not actually attributed to
his efforts but to the mission, decided upon by the Executive
and agreed upon by the Senate.

These actions demonstrated

the purpose and determination of the American government. 9 3

I

Other important factors working for the cession were the
approaching war between England and France and the possibility
of Americans reacquiring the right of deposit by force.94
Livingston gave himself the credit for a successful
settlement with
and the Senate.

I

Franc~

while Monroe praised Jefferson,

I~1adison

The central figure in the entire negotiations

was really none of these persons or groups but Napoleon Bonaparte
himself.

his plans.

The French ministers upheld his wishes and promoted
When Napoleon changed his mind about the western

empire, the ministers became less evasive and made offers and
91 Malone, p. 301.
9 2 Dangerfield, p. 379.
93Malone, p. 301.

94Autobiography of James Nonroe, p. 167.
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concessions to the Americans.
personality.
ti

Napoleon was the focal

His expectation that Grea·t Britain, in the

case of war, would capture Louisiana and his conclusion that
it would, therefor.e., be best to cede the land to the

u. s.

in order to prevent it from becoming British was part of
s~~uel

Bemis's explanation of the First Consul's behavior.

Also Leclerc's defeat and General Victor's inability to
leave an icebound harbor destroyed Napoleon's plan for a
a~

western empire ~nd made Lo~isiana worthless to France./~

Dumas Malone believed Napoleon became willing to sell
1

Louisiana to check any Anglo-American alliance.

By leaving

Louisiana, France renoved the major cause of antagonism
between herself and the

u. s.

and perhaps assured herself

of American neutrality.9 6
Attributing the sale of Louisiana to a n1fI11ber of causes,
George Dangerfield wrote:
No event is due to a single cause: and, unless
we dismiss the theory of causation altogether,
the cession of Louisiana can be ascribed to a
complex of successive or simultaneous: pressures.97
Those pre.ssures included the Negroes' resistanoo at
Santo Domingo, Charles IV 1 s and Godoy's unwillingness to
release the Floridas to Spain and General Victor's inability

9.5Bemis, p.

65.

96Malone, p. 294.

97Dangerfield, p. 371.
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to leave Holland.

The West's reaction to the closure of

New Orleans created an additional pressure as Livingston
assured Napoleon and Talleyrand that Westerners would take
New Orleans by force if they were not guaranteed rights
of deposit and navigation.
Livingston's assurances.

Pichon's dispatches confirmed
When Monroe was en route to France,

the uncertain mood of his mission created an additional
problem as did the Ross Resolution.9 8
Dangerfield believes Napoleon lost interest in Louisiana
shortly after learning of Leclerc's death and the destruction
of his army.

These factors, plus General Victor's failure

to disembark from hisicebound harbor, led to the disintegration of Napoleon's plans for a western empire.

The First

Consul's decision to sell Louisiana resulted from these
mounting pressures and the "importunate presence o.f Minister
Livingston."

The Americans memorial may have received slight

attention from Napoleon when it was first published but
D. tgerfield proposes that with

Napo~eon 1 s

retentive memory,

he would have reconsidered Livingston's question of Louisiana's
value to France when his plans in the West appeared to sour. 99

9 8 nangerfield, p. 370-371.

99Ibid., pp. 370-371.
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All of these factors compelled Napoleon· to lose interest

in Louisiana and to shift his attention to England.
Dangerfield concludes:

It might, therefore, be maintained--and here
is maintained--that Bonaparte did not give up
Louisiana because of the irnminence of war with
England, but that the war with England was due
to his losing interest in Louisiana.100
War also enters into Merrill Peterson's recitation
of "Bonaparte's vagaries."

Napoleon, unable to defend

Louisiana while marching to the. east and fighting England,
found he could not march or engage in war with specie.
The specie was available through the sale of Louisiana and
the destruction of British power was possible by securing the
American friendship through the cession of Louisiana to the
u. s.101
Without Napoleon, there would have been no Louisiana

I

Purchase; his approval initiated serious negotiations.

The

decision to sell almost 600,000,000 acres became a more
attractive alternative as plans for the western empire
crumbled.

Victory in Santo Domingo required more money and

men; the price would be exorbitant and success was not
guaranteed.

i.
I

!l

The loss of Santo Domingo was only one factor in
rejecting ~he plan to· attack New Orleans.

I

lOODangerfield, p.
lOlPeterson, pp.

370.

759-769.
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suggestions of some Americans and Pichonts dispatches led·

s.

French officials to believe that a sufficient number of U.
citizens were willing to secure New Orleans by force and to
wage war.in order to preserve their commercial rights along
the Mississippi River.

These reactions to the closure of
appointm~nt

New Orleans, Monroe's

Resolution testified to

I·

.A..~erica's

and the proposed Ross
determination to protect

Her interests.
With the West no longer of value to Napoleon, his
attention shifted elsewhere.

Military aspirations and the

depressed state of French finances forced him to seek ways
of securing specie.

The alternative Livingston had been

promoting for months now seemed quite attractive to Napoleon.
Livingston's persistence affirmed America's interest in New
Orleans and West Florida and encouraged Napoleon.

If the

u. s.

was willing to buy these, perhaps she would pay for all of
Louisiana.
Livi~gston's

diplomacy attracted enough attention to be

taken seriously by the First Consul.

America was intent upon

solving a problem which threatened her economy; her persistence
could hinder whatever plans France could make for Louisiana
/

without Santo Domingo.

American diplomacy did not endear

the United.States to Napoleon but rather through it, he foresaw
how her willingness to buy land could allow him to pursue
French expansionism in Europe.

CHAPTER VII
CAVEAT EMPTOR
The signing of the Louisiana Treaty did not solve
all problems but created new concerns and unfavorable reactions in France, Spain and the United States.
Shortly after May 2, 1803, Livingston and Madison
heard rumors of Napoleon's dissatisfaction with the treaty.
The American ministers informed Madison that Napoleon was
said to have regretted signing the Treaty and Talleyrand was
making numerous objections in order to discourage the First
Consul from honoring the agreement.

From various channels

Livingston and Monroe learned that the F±rst Counsul considered
the Treaty under his control and believed that he could,
therefore, impose further conditions until ratifications
were exchanged with the United States.

1

On June

25

advised Jefferson:
I hope in God that nothing will prevent your
immediate ratification ••• be persuaded that
France is sick of this bargain & that Spain is
much dissatisfied & the slightest pretence
will lose:~ou the treaty.2

1

2

Ammon, p. 220.
Dangerfield, p. 372.

Livingston
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Louisiana had never officially.been surrendered to·
France under the terms outlined by the Treaty of San Ildefonso.
When the Louisiana Treaty became known to Spaniards in Louisiana
and Spain, their reaction was unfavorable to the U.

s.

Public and court opinion forced Minister Yrujo to serve
notice on the American Government.

The Spanish Minister

warned Jefferson and Madison not to submit the treaty for

v'

ratification since France had contracted with Spain never
to cede Louisiana to any other power.

By violating that

agreement, the treaty cession was void.3
threat that

There was even the

·spain would prevent by force America's possession

of Louisiana.

Madison thought this unlikely and Jefferson,

knowing that the Spanish force in the delta numbered only
three hundred demoralized men, was inclined to regard it as
a bluff. 4
By May 1804 the Spanish opposition had ceased.

Yrujo

confided to Madison:
The explanations which the Government of France has
given to His Catholic Majesty concerning the sale
of Louisiana to the u. s., and the amicable disposition on the part of the King my master toward
these States, have determined him to abanaon the
opposition which, at a prior period, and with the
most substantial ~otives, he haa .manifested against
that transaction.
3Her:mann, p.

34.

4Madison, p. 316.
5state Papers and Correspondence, p. 290.
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French objections triggered ratification despite·

/

Jefferson's qualms about the possible unconstitutionality of
the acquisition.

The purchase of land, the granting of

citizenship to the inhabitants and the division of the territory into states which would be admitted into the Union were
not among the enumerated powers given to Congress in the-

u.

S. Constitution nor did they clearly qualify under the

"necessary and proper" clause.

However, upon learning of

Napoleon's discontent, Jefferson abandoned his constitutional
apprehensions and concluded:
Whatever Congress shall think it necessary to
do, should be done with as little debate as
possible, and particularly so ~ar as respects
the constitutional difficulty.
Some Federalists objected to the Treaty on the basis of
its expense, the unintelligible territorial limits of the
Purchase and the possible power shift from New England to the
South and West when the lands became states. 7

Despite these

objections, ratification soon followed with the U.

s.

acquiring control of New Orleans on December 20, 1803.

formally

8

In addition to these reactions and concerns the claims
convention in France also experienced some problems primarily
resulting from the haste in which they were drawn.

6 State Papers and Correspondence, pp. 236-237.

7

..
Cox, p.

8

94.

Hermann, p.

34.

The first
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conflict arose when the preamble of the treaty was compared
to agreements previously made between the United States and
France.

The preamble stated that the purpose of the claims

convention was to obtain money due A..'llerican citizens under
the Second and Fifth Articles of the Convention· ·of 1800.
However, these claims had first been postponed and then
abandoned!9
Secondly, Livingston's relationship with the claims
commission generated controversy and damaged the minister's
reputation.

This commission consisted of three commissioners

who were to approve the claims first.

Then the French govern-

ment and Livingston were to verify them with the latter
authorizing the payments.

From the beginning Livingston

conflicted with the commission whose funds were limited
and whose members were unwilling to satisfy the claims
Livingston submitted.

Disagreement also resulted when the

commissioners denied that they labored under Livingston's
authority, failed to authorize any claims prior to the
United States' ratification of the treaty and insisted that
none be paid until all had been examined.

The relationship

between Livingston and the claims ·commission became so heated
that the commissioners in December 1803 refused to attend a
dinner ceiebrating the treaty since· Livingston would be present. 10 .
9Dangerfield, p. 375.
10
Ammon, p. 222.
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Criticism of Livingston's activities and of his
promotion of certain claimants reached Monroe in England
who relayed the details to Madison.

11

Monroe affirmed the

integrity of the commissioners and when Livingston appealed
to Monroe for cooperation, the American minister in England
replied that the commissioners "are responsible for their
own con d uc t , not we •••• nl2
When the claims commissioners completed their work,
they had directed 324 claims to be liquidated, rejected 142
and left five to be decided.

The majority of the prize cases

were still pending before the Council of Prizes.

France

conducted the final disposition of the claims and the U.
Treasury did not make full payment.

s.

The payments which were

made were tainted with charges of corruption directed toward
French bureaus and the reputations of persons involved with
the claims, including Livingston's, were stained.

An

admirer of Livingston's, Henry Adams, observed, "Livingston's
diplomatic career was poisoned by quarrels over this money. nl3
French and Spanish opposition, the question of thv
constitutionality of the Purchase and the problems of the
claims convention were not the only issues raised by the
Louisiana Purchase.
11

12

Tnere was also the West Florida controversy.

.

Ammon, p. 222.
Dangerfield, p.

13 Ibid., p. 387.

383.
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Negotiators in Paris had been instructed to purchase
(

the Floridas as well as New Orleans.

The boundaries of the

Louisiana Purchase were unclear and therefore the clause
stating that Louisiana included all the area which France
ceded to Spain in the Treaty of Fontainebleau of
to multiple interpretations.

1762 led

France remained evasive about

.the borders while Spain maintained that French boundaries
did not extend as far east as the Perdido River.

Jefferson

agreed with the Spanish until he personally studied the issue
in the aftermath of the

~ur·chase

and concluded that the

boundary was the Perdido River. 1 4
ln February 1804 Congress enacted the Mobile Act which
extended American jurisdiction over the disputed region
between the Mississippi and Perdido Rivers. 1 5

Spain's protest,

her attempts to frustrate Monroe's efforts to secure the
Floridas, her refusal to exchange the Floridas for Americanclaimed Texas, and her spoliations on America's neutral
j.

shipping estranged the Spanish from Americans and encouraged
some U.

s.

citizens to propose war.

Jefferson and his

Cabinet hesitated and Monroe failed to acquire the Floridas.
The West Florida controversy was not resolved during
Jefferson's administrations.
1

In February 1819 Spain finally

4varg, p. 157.

15 Cox, p. 89.
16 Bemis, A Short History of American Foreign Policy
and Diplomacy, p.

97.

16

12q

l

agreed to cede the Floridas in place of a spoliation payment
1
of $5,000,000 due Americans. 7 These claims resulted from
Spain's nonadherence to several terms of the Pinckney Treaty
of 179.5.

In violation of the treaty Indians residing in

Spanish territory had crossed Florida's northern boundary,
damaged American property, and murdered approximately .500
Americans over a ten year period of time; the Spanish had
arbitrarily closed the mouth of the Mississippi in October

1802; and Spain had failed to observe during the intermittent
European wars, American neutrality. 18
Despite America's failure to secure the Floridas during
Jefferson's Presidency, foreign affairs appear as a secondary
concern in Jefferson's Annual Message of December 1806.
President encouraged internal improvements:

The

the abolition

of the slave trade, extensive building of roads and canals,
the founding of a national university, fortification of the
coasts and the organization of a national militia. 1 9

17 Sprague, p. 328.
18 sarouel Flagg Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Foundations
of American

Forei~n

Policy (New York:

1949), pp. 304-30 •
19 Adams, p. 126.

Alfred A. Knopf,

CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION

r/

As a result of the Louisiana Purchase, the United States
had almost doubled in size.

Louisiana's natural resources

and her agricultural products would enhance the American
economy while the incorporation of the land as states of the
Union would strengthen her position in foreign affairs.
After signing the Purchase, Livingston remarked, "We
have lived long but this is the noblest work of our whole
lives." 1

The role of American diplomacy in the acquisition

of Louisiana does not deserve the emphasis Livingston was
inclined to give it.

Livingston, Jefferson, Madison and

Monroe had been persistent in pressing France to relinquish
certain areas which if owned by the

u. s.

would remove the

threats to the rights of deposita.ndnavigation facing America's
western population.
Although these immediate problems were the impetus
in negotiating for New Orleans and the Floridas, the
Louisiana Purchase promised

to~help

concept of an agrarian America.
1

l

.

Peterson, pp.

759-760.

fulfill Jefferson's
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Louisiana's 600,000,000 acres of land offered
i~r.umerable

opportunities for farming.

According to

Jefferson, farming produced the kind of citizen best qualified
for meeting the demands of a republican government. 2

The

New England Federalists and their menacing policies, which,
Jefferson believed, sought to suppress republicanism, would
be counterbalanced by the farmers who would soon be cultivating
the land secured by the Louisiana Purchase.

/

To Thomas Jefferson and Napoleon Bonaparte this one
transaction furthered American republicanism and French
expansionism respectively.

Americans were willing to pay

for this land at a time when Napoleon needed money and when
his aspirations for a French empire in North A.merica were
crumbling.

Into this realm of Napoleon's faltering dreams

and aspiring military conquests in

Eurcp~

came two American

diplomats who offered the French militarist the means to
resume French expansionism in Europe and the Mediterranean,
and in return received enough land to make the United States
the second nation in total area in the world.3

Mi~ler, pp. 72-74.
3 Smelser, p. 101.
2
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